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CIVIL RIGHTS, CHARTER SCHOOLS, AND LESSONS TO BE
LEARNED
Derek W. Black ∗
Abstract
Two major structural shifts have occurred in education reform in the
past two decades: the decline of civil rights reforms and the rise of
charter schools. Courts and policy makers have relegated traditional
civil rights reforms that address segregation, poverty, disability, and
language barriers to near irrelevance, while charter schools and policies
supporting their creation and expansion have rapidly increased and now
dominate federal policy. Advocates of traditional civil rights reforms
interpret the success of charter schools as a threat to their cause, and,
consequently, have fought the expansion of charter schools. This Article
argues that the civil rights community has misinterpreted both its own
decline and the rise of charter schools. Rather than look for external
explanations, civil rights advocates should turn their scrutiny inward.
And rather than attack charter schools, they should learn from them.
A close examination of past civil rights movements in education
reveals that their decline was inevitable. Each of the various educational
movements depended on establishing a causal connection between the
reform sought and positive student outcomes. But precisely establishing
causal connections in education is nearly impossible. Education
involves too many variables to isolate conclusively the effects of
educational policies on student outcomes. Ignoring this reality leaves
civil rights reforms vulnerable to contraction. This weakness—not
competition from charter schools—continues to undermine civil rights
reform.
Charter schools suffer from the same causal weakness, but it is not
impeding their expansion because the charter movement, unlike civil
rights, is not based primarily on evidence. Instead, charter school
advocates emphasize ideological values that appeal to broad
constituencies. These value-based constituencies form a movement that
forces the expansion of charter schools and is undeterred by evidentiary
critique. To regain relevance, civil rights advocates must scale back
their reliance on evidentiary claims and reframe their arguments in
terms of compelling values that can again inspire a movement.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, educational civil rights advocates have felt the
policy world shift underneath their feet. One of the primary factors in
this shift has been the increasing prevalence of charter schools and
favorable policies encouraging their continual expansion. Since the late
1990s, when charter schools numbered only in the hundreds, 1 charter
schools have grown exponentially. Today there are over five thousand
charter schools in operation, 2 serving over two million children. 3
1. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS PROGRAM:
YEAR ONE EVALUATION REPORT iii (2000).
2. Schools Overview, NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS. (2011),
http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/year/2011; see also CTR. FOR RESEARCH
ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN 16 STATES 9
(2009).
3. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., BACK TO SCHOOL TALLIES: ESTIMATED
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While not the initial driving force behind this trend, federal policy
has increasingly supported it and is now a leading advocate. When
Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),
charter schools were still operating at the margins of educational policy
and were largely relegated to a footnote in federal law. 4 Less than a
decade later, charter schools dominate the policy world. In 2009, the
U.S. Secretary of Education stressed that states that “put artificial caps
on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their applications under
the [$4.35 billion] Race to the Top Fund.” 5 Many states responded by
immediately dropping their resistance to charters and eliminating caps
on the number of charter schools they would authorize. 6 Today, the
fascination with charter schools has become so intense that charter
schools are effectively sucking all the air out of reform conversations
and limiting the discussion of other reform options. Other reform
policies are, at worst, ignored and, at best, measured based on their
consistency with a charter school agenda. 7
The growth and increasing relevance of charter schools has roughly
coincided with the decreasing relevance of traditional civil rights
reforms. As a result, advocates for racial, ethnic, and disability equality
in education have understandably perceived charter schools as the
enemy. Leading researchers and advocates have charged that charter
schools are more racially and socioeconomically segregated than
regular public schools, and that they routinely discourage the enrollment
of students with language or disability needs. 8 Charter school advocates
NUMBER OF PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOLS & STUDENTS, 2011–2012 at 1 (Dec. 2011)
www.publiccharters.com/ publication/?id=637.
4. The only mention of charter schools in the main provisions of the Act are to indicate
that they are an acceptable option for students exercising the voluntary transfer provision and an
acceptable method for restructuring a school in need of improvement. 20 U.S.C.
§ 6316(b)(8)(B)(i) (2006); 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006).
5. David Nagel, Charter School Support Is a Prerequisite for Race to the Top Funds,
THE JOURNAL (June 09, 2009), http://thejournal.com/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-supportis-a-prerequisite-for-race-to-the-top-funds.aspx.
6. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, Perdue Signs Law Lifting Cap on Charter Schools, NEWS
& OBSERVER (June 17, 2011) (discussing North Carolina’s elimination of its cap on charter
schools), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/17/1281607/perdue-signs-law-lifting-cap-on.html.
7. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV 257, 270,
280 (1999).
8. See generally ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, CHOICE WITHOUT
EQUITY: CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS (2010)
(criticizing charter schools and revealing the rift between charter advocates and civil rights
advocates). There are charter schools whose mission is to serve students who speak English as a
second language, see generally Alexandra Villarreal O’Rourke, Picking up the Pieces after
PICS: Evaluating Current Efforts to Narrow the Education Gap, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 263,
274–75 (2008), but those schools are the exception rather than the rule, and are technically
segregated as well.
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respond that civil rights advocates are unfairly comparing charter
schools to all public schools, rather than to public schools in the
particular neighborhoods where charter schools are located. 9 In
addition, charter school supporters assert that the racial and
socioeconomic characteristics of charters are secondary to the real goal
of expanding quality education for disadvantaged students. 10 In short,
segregation is irrelevant if students are receiving a higher quality of
education in charters. 11 As to the latter point, civil rights advocates
counter that most charter schools are not delivering the improved
academic outcomes they promise and fall short of the opportunities that
integrated middle-income schools could offer. 12
This line of attack by civil rights advocates, even if reasoned, misses
the point. First, it draws civil rights advocates into a battle against
charter schools, rather than one for civil rights. This battle is
counterproductive regardless of the winner, but the recent trajectory of
charter schools suggests that charter schools will be the winner by a
large margin. 13 Second, the truth is that most educational civil rights
were marginalized long before the rise of charter schools for reasons
related to their own shortcomings. The United States Supreme Court
placed major limitations on desegregation as early as the 1970s and
effectively ensured its end in the 1990s; 14 lower courts established
standards for English Language Learner claims that assured their
ineffectiveness just a few years after Congress passed the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act; 15 the focus on individual remedies in
special education law narrowed its impact from the outset; 16 and courts
9. Gary Ritter et al., A Closer Look at Charter Schools and Segregation, EDUC. NEXT,
Summer 2010, at 69, 69.
10. Melanie Smollin, Should Segregated Charter Schools Integrate? Does it Matter That
Their Schools are Segregated?, TAKE PART (June 10, 2011), http://www.takepart.com/node/178
33/actions (reporting that KIPP charter schools’ Los Angeles Executive Director does not think
segregation in charter schools matters).
11. Id.
12. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CHARTER SCHOOLS THAT WORK: ECONOMICALLY
INTEGRATED SCHOOLS WITH TEACHER VOICE 8 (2010); see also Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White
Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 644 (2011).
13. See generally Molly Peterson, Charter Schools Gain Support from 64% of U.S. Adults
in Survey, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 26, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=newsarchive&sid=aWRZ1.Y3s9Jo (reporting that a majority of Americans support charter
schools despite confusion about charter schools).
14. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 102 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499
(1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
752 (1974); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213–14 (1973).
15. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981).
16. Cf. Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education
Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 430 (2001) (arguing for
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have demanded evidence of a causal connection between money and
student outcomes in school finance litigation that litigants have
struggled to establish. 17 Given this reality, attacks on charter schools are
misdirected, and they distract civil rights advocates from asking the
important question of why their own reforms have waned while charter
schools are gaining strength.
The answer is that civil rights reforms have not failed because
charter schools, or any other policy for that matter, have undermined
them. Rather, education reform litigation across the various paradigms
has consistently failed because the movements share a central flaw: the
inability to establish a precise causal connection between educational
policy and inputs on the one hand and student outcomes on the other. 18
When advocates increasingly focus their movements on legal claims
premised on causal connections, advocates set themselves up for failure.
Not recognizing this harsh reality, civil rights advocates simply press
for better evidence. But better evidence cannot be found because the
particular causal gaps that plague educational civil rights reform are
inherent in the educational process itself. Thus, pursuing educational
reform primarily through litigation and evidence-based arguments
leaves traditional civil rights reforms perpetually vulnerable to
contraction because the evidentiary gaps endemic to those movements
can be exposed any time courts or policy makers care to scrutinize
them.
Ironically, from an evidentiary point of view, charter schools have
had far more to overcome than civil rights advocates. Charter school
advocates have asserted that they could improve student outcomes.19
They have pointed to the purported failure of past reform policies to
demonstrate that the system is broken and that the bureaucratic
stranglehold on education makes it incapable of change from within. 20
They have argued that school choice, market forces, and the flexibility
that charters can bring to education would foster efficiency, innovation,
and educational quality that would improve student outcomes. 21 But
nearly two decades into the charter school movement, the pedagogy of
charter schools has yet to demonstrate a significant causal effect on
student outcomes. While a small percentage of charter schools
alternative avenues of relief for IDEA violations because of the disproportionate impact on lowincome students of color due to the focus on individual remedies).
17. See infra Section II.C.
18. See infra Part II.
19. Pearl Rock Kane & Christopher J. Lauricella, Assessing the Growth and Potential of
Charter Schools, in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE,
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 203, 205 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001).
20. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 3
(1990).
21. Kane & Lauricella, supra note 19, at 210–30.
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outperform public schools, most do not. Forty-six percent of charter
schools perform at the same level as public schools and 37% perform at
a level significantly below public schools. 22 Only 17% of charter
schools actually outperform their local public schools. 23 Thus, the data
“reveals in unmistakable terms that, in the aggregate, charter students
are not faring as well as their [traditional public school] counterparts.” 24
Yet the trajectory of charter schools stands in stark contrast to that
of civil rights reforms. Charter schools suffer from their own
evidentiary weaknesses, but they have not yet fallen victim to the
general trend of reform failure in civil rights. Charter schools have
succeeded where civil rights advocates, as of late, have failed because
charter school advocates have built a movement that appeals to values
and interests that do not rest on an evidentiary showing alone. At the
broadest level, charter schools are a “movement” in every sense of the
word, while traditional civil rights reforms have been reduced to
evidentiary claims. And insofar as the evidence for traditional civil
rights reforms is no worse and often better than the evidence for charter
schools, 25 the absence of a “movement” would appear to have little to
do with the efficacy of the reform. That is not to say that evidence is
irrelevant, but that evidence alone is insufficient, as it is only one of
several relevant considerations. Recognizing this, charter school
advocates have built a movement based on political and ideological
claims as much as evidentiary claims. The expansion of charter schools
thus demonstrates that a strong value-based movement can render weak
evidence linking educational policy to increased student outcomes
irrelevant. In this regard, charter school advocates can teach educational
civil rights advocates so much.
In particular, charter schools appeal to two important ideological
values that sustain them regardless of their results: individual autonomy
22. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 2, at 3.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 6.
25. For instance, one of the most consistent social science findings of the past several
decades is the positive effect of socioeconomic integration on achievement. JAMES S. COLEMAN
ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 21–22 (1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN REPORT];
RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH
PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 6, 47–76 (2001); Geoffrey Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and
Inequality: A Multilevel Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112
TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1201 (2010); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education:
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1355–56 (2004); Russell
W. Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Segregation Still Matter? The Impact of Social
Composition on Academic Achievement in Southern High School, 107 TCHRS. COLL. REC. 1999,
1999 (2005). Though not as strong, a solid basis exists to show that money affects educational
opportunities. See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational
Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1476–79 (2007).
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and free market mentality. 26 Ultimately, some parents and advocates
care little about whether charter schools on the whole are successful or
even whether their own charter school is more successful than their
local public school. What they desire is self-determination. Thus, the
power to control their children’s educational choices has value in and of
itself. 27 In effect, a qualitatively worse education in a school of their
choosing is preferable, if not superior, to a similar education in a school
not of their choosing. 28 Interests in individual autonomy intersect with
business interests that adhere unflinchingly to the market’s ability to
respond to consumer needs and choice, which they believe will
necessarily produce better schools. 29 That many charters are lowperforming now is irrelevant. The market will replace them over time
with better schools.
The power of these two ideologies has built a constituency that
demands charter expansion regardless of the underlying data and
evidence. While educational civil rights once leveraged moral- and
value-based claims, that focus has been lost over the years. Civil rights
reforms now are more often a battle of evidence and social science in
the courts or policy preference in legislative processes. As a result,
educational civil rights remain vulnerable to perpetual constraints by the
causal gaps that inherently exist in education. In contrast, charter
schools gain influence despite the lack of an evidentiary basis to support
them. Likewise, civil rights advocates’ assertions of evidentiary
superiority in comparison to charters have little, if any, effect on the
policy conversation. In short, the civil rights and charter school
movements are operating on two different levels: an evidentiary one
that boxes civil rights advocates into failure and a value-based one that
offers charter schools a chance for success.
If educational civil rights are going to have any significant relevance
in the future, it will not come from attacking charter schools or
marshalling better evidence; it will come from following charter
schools’ strategic lead and recognizing that past civil rights victories in
26. See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note 20 (discussing individual autonomy and free
market mentality as applied to public and private schools).
27. See Jack Buckley & Mark Schneider, Are Charter School Parents More Satisfied with
Schools? Evidence from Washington, DC, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC. 57, 58 (2006); Danielle HolleyWalker, The Accountability Cycle: The Recovery School District Act and New Orleans’ Charter
Schools, 40 CONN. L. REV. 125, 147 (2007) (explaining that some support charter schools
because of the “parent driven school governance”).
28. Cf. Argun Saatcioglu et al., Parental Expectations and Satisfaction with Charter
Schools Evidence from a Midwestern City School District, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 428, 432–
33 (noting that parents of children enrolled in charters are likely satisfied with a school of their
own choosing, even if its academic programs are lacking).
29. See Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and
American Pluralism, 120 YALE L. J. 814, 819 (2011).
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education were as much, if not more, a product of the moral claims they
asserted as any substantiating evidence. School desegregation, in
particular, is a perfect example of the relevance of extrajudicial
movements and claims. Desegregation was initially grounded in far
more than legal doctrine. In its earlier stages, desegregation was a
movement within and without courts that was also grounded in morals
and politics. 30 During that period, courts were more than willing to
ignore causal gaps in plaintiffs’ claims and resolve uncertainties in
plaintiffs’ favor. 31 But once desegregation’s moral claim receded and its
popular movement fractured, it quickly fell victim to evidentiary battles
that it could not win.32 If charter schools can teach civil rights advocates
anything, it is that they must begin once again to frame their claims in
ways that appeal to moral- and value-based sentiments. Otherwise,
educational civil rights reforms will remain subject to the inherent
evidentiary limits of education that will perpetually doom them.
Currently, it is far from clear that educational civil rights advocates
even recognize the common and inevitable source of their failure: the
uncertain causal connection between educational policy and educational
outcomes. Part I of this Article forces this realization to the fore by
canvassing the major educational civil rights reform movements and
identifying the specific causal assertions on which each was premised.
Part I reveals that the claims of each movement share a common
weakness and that, while courts may overlook these weaknesses for a
period of time, external events eventually arise that encourage the
exploitation of these weaknesses and the end of reform. Part II responds
to those who would press for better evidence and social science under
the belief that past failures are a result of evidentiary anomalies. This
second Part demonstrates that a purely evidentiary-based approach to
education reform results in inevitable failure because the nature of
education is not susceptible to evidentiary certainty. Rather, causal gaps
are inherent to education. After establishing these predicates that
demand a new strategy, the Article in Part III examines how charter
schools have been successful notwithstanding their weak evidentiary
basis, concluding that their success is attributable to the values they
promote and the wide constituency to which these values appeal.
Successes in educational civil rights have, likewise, been tied to larger
movements based on values and justice. Losses, however, correspond
with an inability to sustain these value-based movements. Thus, this
30. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1994) (detailing the events of Brown
v. Board of Education).
31. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); Green
v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 434–35 (1968).
32. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 93, 95–96, 102, 120 (1995); Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 499 (1992).
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Article concludes by urging civil rights advocates to refocus on framing
their educational concerns in terms of justice and values that can sustain
movements and to avoid reducing their claims to battles over evidence
and good policy.
I. EDUCATION’S REOCCURRING CAUSAL GAP ACROSS TIME AND CLAIMS
Professor Ronald Dworkin, as early as 1977, warned advocates
against opening the Pandora’s Box of causation in school
desegregation. 33 To do so would lead courts down an analytical path
from which desegregation could not escape victorious. 34 What he could
not predict, however, was that so few would take note in desegregation
and in other subsequent educational civil rights movements. While his
comments were not directed to the latter, the connections and analogies
to the latter should have been clear. Ironically, very few, if any, scholars
and advocates have even paused in all of the subsequent years to reflect
on the centrality of causation in limiting educational civil rights
movements. The result has been a gross oversight of a key weakness
and, thus, a perpetual inclination to succumb to it.
As the following Sections demonstrate, educational legal reform
movements have largely been defined by the causation problems they
confront. From school desegregation and school finance to the rights of
English Language Learners and students with disabilities, causation
issues have consistently constrained advocates’ ability to substantiate
claims and secure remedies. The extent to which courts overlook or
examine these issues has been the difference in plaintiffs’ success.
When courts have relaxed or ignored causation inquiries, plaintiffs have
had relatively little difficulty in establishing their claims. But in most
instances where courts have seriously examined causal questions, they
have found evidentiary gaps or demanded such precise evidence that
plaintiffs have been unable to provide it. As a result, causal inquiries
have served to limit liability under existing claims or eliminate classes
of claims altogether.
A. School Desegregation
The centrality of causation to the fall of educational claims is most
obvious in school desegregation. In the earliest years of desegregation,
causation was unquestioned and effectively irrelevant. Schools were
emerging from a period in which they had entirely barred minorities
from attending white schools. That those prohibitions were the cause of

33. See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences
of Uncertainty, 6 J.L. EDUC. 3, 12 (1977).
34. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 6

1732

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

segregation in schools was beyond question. 35 In addition, the Court’s
initial failure to specify any remedy other than eliminating mandated
segregation avoided tough causal questions. 36 But once the Court
demanded affirmative desegregation, the question of causation—at least
theoretically—became important.
As later described by the Court, the goal of Brown v. Board of
Education 37 was to restore victims of segregation to their former
positions.38 Since courts cannot turn back the clock, restoring victims to
their former position necessarily raises the question of the extent to
which current segregation is attributable to past discrimination. Past
discrimination and segregation could be the sole causes of all-black and
all-white schools, but it is also possible that they only caused a
disproportionately large or significant number of minorities to attend
non-white schools. The Court’s earliest desegregation cases, however,
avoided inquiries into these sorts of specific causal questions because
they are effectively impossible to resolve, and any attempt to do so
would have undermined the moral interests in eradicating legally
sponsored discrimination. 39
As soon as desegregation moved outside the South, however, the
Court immediately questioned the causal connection between
segregation and discriminatory state action. Rather than assume a causal
connection, the Court in Keyes v. School District No. 1 held that, in a
district that was not previously segregated by law, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that intentional discrimination was the cause of current
segregation. 40 The requirement that plaintiffs identify a racial
motivation to segregate students and connect it to actual segregative
results represented a clear shift away from the previous paradigm to one
that placed limits on schools’ duty to desegregate and left segregation
that is not causally connected to past discrimination untouched. 41
The Court, however, was keenly aware that bringing these causal
inquiries to the fore could end or prohibit desegregation just a few years
after it had begun. As the end of de jure segregation became more
distant in time, establishing liability would become increasingly
35. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487–88, 494 (1954).
36. Id. at 495–96 (reserving the question of a remedy for subsequent argument).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
39. See generally J. HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 62 (1979) (“No single decision has had more moral
force than Brown . . . .”); Paul Bender, Is the Burger Court Really Like the Warren Court?, 82
MICH. L. REV. 635, 647 (1984) (describing segregation as a moral disaster).
40. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973).
41. Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in
Sheff v. O’Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 351, 371 (1996) (describing the effect of the
intent–causation standard as devastating to desegregation).
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difficult. New acts of intentional discrimination would not be as blatant
as old ones, 42 nor would the causal connection between old policies and
current circumstances be clear. 43 The passage of time alone would
guarantee changes in school board membership, school district
administration, neighborhood compositions, and school enrollments,44
any of which would complicate causal inferences. To mitigate the
possibility of immediately undoing vast desegregation remedies, the
Court held that, if a plaintiff could establish that intentional
discrimination was the cause of a substantial portion of the segregation
in a school district, it would presume that discrimination was the cause
of all other segregation in the district. 45 This presumption would also
apply across time, with past discrimination presumptively causing
current segregation. 46 Thus, while the Court’s intent standard marked a
clear limitation on desegregation in many districts, this presumption
would potentially authorize even more expansive desegregation
remedies in those districts that could overcome the initial threshold
questions of intent and causation.
Quickly realizing the possibility of the latter, the Court—shortly
after adopting the causal presumption—began to curtail its application.
Taken to its natural conclusion, there is very little racial inequality in
schools to which the presumption would not apply. 47 Thus, just one year
later, in Milliken v. Bradley, the Court made a crucial distinction
between intra- and inter-district segregation, and refrained from
applying the presumption to the latter. 48 In the lower court, the plaintiffs
had established intentional segregation by the Detroit school system,
along with the collusion of the state and some surrounding districts. 49
The precise extent and cause of segregation in the entire metropolitan
area were certainly vague, but applying the presumption to the
established instances of segregation theoretically could have warranted
42. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 212–13 (describing how facially neutral assignment policies may
in fact be discriminatory).
43. Id. at 211 (indicating that the connection between past discrimination and current
segregation may be “so attenuated as to be incapable of supporting a finding of de jure
segregation”).
44. See, e.g., Thomas Cnty. Branch of the NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299
F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351 (2004).
45. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
46. Id. at 210.
47. James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183, 195–201 (2003); see also Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683, 706 (N.D. Texas
1981) (“Over time, disproof of causation might become increasingly difficult for the
defendant . . . . It may become impossible ever to prove . . . that past school segregation no
longer has an impact on residential segregation.”).
48. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974).
49. Id.
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desegregation in the wider metropolitan area. 50
The Supreme Court, however, held that a metropolitan-wide remedy
was unjustifiable in the absence of more substantial intentional
discrimination by the suburban districts themselves. 51 The Court made
no mention of the presumption, notwithstanding the state’s
discrimination, its control over the suburban districts, and some
instances of discrimination by the suburban districts themselves. The
Court dismissed the suburban discrimination as insignificant and the
state involvement as too attenuated. 52 In effect, the Court went from
presuming a connection between current and past intra-district
segregation in Keyes to presuming the opposite regarding the
connection to inter-district segregation in Milliken.
Three years later, the Court in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman 53 went even further to limit the presumption’s effect in intradistrict cases. The Court required plaintiffs to demonstrate the
“incremental segregative effect” of past discrimination on the current
“racial distribution of [a] school population,” as measured by the
difference between the current level of segregation and “what it would
have been in the absence of constitutional violations.” 54 Such a precise
causal showing had never even been hinted at previously, but in Dayton
it marked the outer limits of the desegregation remedy. The Court
indicated that the remedy should do no more than “redress that [precise]
difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be
a systemwide remedy.” 55 By forcing the plaintiffs to make these
affirmative causal showings and demanding that plaintiffs close a
practically unresolvable causal gap, the Court implicitly rejected the
presumption and consequently limited desegregation. Ironically, the
Court noted the problem it was creating, writing that such an inquiry
was “a good deal more difficult than is typically the case in a more
orthodox lawsuit” 56 and “not an easy one to resolve.” 57
Subsequent decisions distinguished Dayton’s facts and forestalled
the rapid deceleration of desegregation that the incremental causal
effects requirement would have wrought. 58 But Dayton’s fundamental
50. In fact, courts in both the Sixth and Fourth Circuits had upheld an interdistrict remedy.
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582,
593 (E.D. Mich. 1971). See generally Bradley v. Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67, 92, 106 (E.D. Va.
1972) (holding that a plan to integrate schools in adjacent counties would be enforced).
51. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745.
52. Id. at 748–49.
53. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
54. Id. at 420.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id.
58. Dayton involved a peculiar set of facts. The district court referred to a “cumulative
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concern regarding the diminishing causal connection between the
original acts of discrimination and current segregation resurfaced later
to usher in the effective end of desegregation in most districts. 59 In
Freeman v. Pitts, the Court held that, “in the late phases of carrying out
a decree, when [racial] imbalance is attributable neither to the prior de
jure system nor to a later violation by the school district but rather to
independent demographic forces,” lower courts are prohibited from
requiring various aggressive desegregation measures. 60 In earlier
periods, the Court had assumed the connection to past discrimination
because both the attribution and nonattribution of current imbalances
were unclear. 61 But the Court’s opinion in Freeman represented both a
refusal to make any such causal assumptions and a shift toward
delineating between the causes of segregation. Moreover, when
significant demographic shifts have occurred, the Court will—to
plaintiffs’ detriment—essentially presume that current segregation is the
result of demographic shifts, rather than discrimination. 62
The Court’s rationale for its holding makes its skepticism regarding
the causal connection between past and present segregation even
clearer. The Court reasoned that although past segregation by the state
was a “stubborn fact[] of history [that can] . . . linger and persist,” it
must not “overstate its consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.”63
For these vestiges of segregation to be any “concern of the law . . . ,
they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation
being remedied.” 64 In most instances, the Court indicated that such a
connection no longer exists. 65 Rather,
[a]s the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and
these demographic changes intervene, it becomes less
likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a
vestige of the prior de jure system. The causal link between
current conditions and the prior violation is even more
violation” rather than a specific violation. Id. at 413. The facts also indicated that no intentional
discrimination affected school attendance boundaries, but the district court faulted the school
district for failing to take affirmative steps to desegregate. Id. at 412.
59. See id. at 417.
60. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 493 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
61. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973).
62. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495; see also David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back
Again: Principle, Pragmatism, and Proximate Cause in the School Desegregation Cases, 68
WASH. L. REV. 753, 794 (1993) (“Freeman allows the school district to rebut causation by
showing that the violation was distant in time.”).
63. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495–96.
64. Id. at 496 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id. (“It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing population
change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation. And the law need not
proceed on that premise.”) (emphasis omitted).
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attenuated if the school district has demonstrated its good
faith. 66
The problem with this reasoning is that the causal effects of past
discrimination have always been “subtle and intangible.” 67 For this very
reason, the Court in Keyes refused to place the full burden of
establishing causation on the plaintiffs. And, given the passage of time,
plaintiffs needed the benefit of the presumption more in Freeman than
in Keyes. But rather than extend the presumption, the Court in Freeman,
at best, acted as though the presumption evaporates over time and, at
worst, reversed it, effectively presuming that demographic shifts sever
the connection between present and past segregation. 68 Given the
inevitable demographic shifts in major metropolitan school districts and
the unresolvable causal inquiry the shifts raise, very few plaintiffs have
been able to meet the evidentiary requirements of Milliken and
Freeman. 69 Thus, a mere shift in the Court’s approach to causal gaps
has been enough to bring an end to desegregation in most districts.
One last option remained for plaintiffs: seeking additional resources
to improve predominantly minority schools and districts where
integration was not required under Supreme Court doctrine. Yet, shortly
after Freeman, the Court’s opinion in Missouri v. Jenkins 70
demonstrated that the causal problems involved in justifying
educational quality improvements are just as complex as those in school
integration remedies. The district court in Jenkins had ordered
qualitative improvements to remedy diminished African-American
achievement. 71 The primary basis for ordering qualitative educational
improvements was that segregation deprived minority students not
simply of the right to attend a school of their choice, but to receive a
quality education, 72 which had the effect of depressing AfricanAmerican achievement. This rationale had sufficed to justify qualitative

66. Id. (emphasis omitted).
67. Id.
68. See generally Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of
Two Kansas Cities, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 475, 559 (1999) (“[T]he causation presumptions appear to
lessen in validity over time”); Crump, supra note 62, at 786.
69. See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING
RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES (2007) (listing major
metropolitan districts where desegregation decrees were dissolved after the Court’s decisions in
Dowell and Freeman).
70. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
71. Id. at 73. The Court interpreted these improvements as an attempt to attract whites
back to the district, which it flatly rejected as inconsistent with Milliken v. Bradley. Id. at 91–93.
72. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 286–87 (1977) (upholding remedial education where actual school desegregation was
not an option).
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improvement remedies since the 1970s. 73
The Court in Jenkins, however, held that qualitative remedies are
only justified when plaintiffs affirmatively demonstrate the causal
connection between segregation and the achievement gap. In particular,
plaintiffs must identify “the incremental effect that segregation has had
on minority student achievement or the specific goals of the quality
education programs.” 74 And the Court presupposed that this effect
would be limited at best, writing that “[j]ust as demographic changes
independent of de jure segregation will affect the racial composition of
student assignments, . . . so too will numerous external factors beyond
the control of the [schools] affect minority student achievement.” 75
Thus, establishing the causal connection between past segregation and
current achievement gaps would be no easier than connecting past
segregation to current segregation. The Court, as in all of its cases after
Keyes, raised a complex causal question and placed the nearly
impossible burden of resolving it on plaintiffs. 76
The chart below of the Department of Justice’s desegregation docket
offers a broad picture of the real-world effects of these causal
requirements. In the early 1960s, the federal government’s involvement
in desegregation was almost nonexistent. After the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Court’s decision in Green, desegregation rapidly grew into
the 1970s, but the Court’s opinions in Milliken and Bradley imposed
limits on this growth that the DOJ would quickly reach in the 1980s.
The Court’s decisions in the 1990s offered the exit strategy from
desegregation that has resulted in its decline ever since.

73.
74.
75.
76.

In re Little Rock Sch. Dist., 839 F.2d 1296, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988).
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101.
Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted).
James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1673 (2003) (indicating that sorting the effects of
past segregation from the effects of various external factors on student achievement is nearly
impossible).
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In sum, in the later stages of desegregation, the Court grew
increasingly skeptical of the causal connection between past
discrimination and either current segregation and the achievement gap.
As a result, it implicitly rejected the Keyes presumption of causation
and forced plaintiffs to make precise causal showings that, as a practical
matter, have proven virtually impossible to establish. The nearly
uniform failure of subsequent plaintiffs to meet these showings simply
reaffirms this evidentiary quandary. 77 Various lower court decisions
demonstrate that causal inquiries into segregation and the achievement
gap necessarily involve ambiguities that most often can only be
resolved through inferences or presumptions, not with precise evidence
or certainty. 78 Plaintiffs can establish faulty conduct on the part of
schools, such as intentional discrimination or segregation, but
quantifying the effects of these acts presents a much higher hurdle.
Thus, the retreat from presumption regarding causation ultimately
marked the end of mandatory desegregation and allowed resegregation
to take its place. 79
B. English Language Learners
The evidentiary gaps involved in causal inquiries, while common
and most obvious in desegregation cases, similarly arise in other major
areas of education law, dictating success and failure for English
Language Learners, disabled students, and low income students and
districts. The evidentiary gaps in these categories of education law have
tended to coalesce around the causal connection between educational
practices and student outcomes. In comparison to Missouri v. Jenkins—
where the causal connection was to be made across time—these areas of
education law are theoretically in a better position to resolve the causal
77. For instance, while almost every metropolitan school district in the country has
experienced significant interdistrict segregation, only two courts have ever found that a
plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to establish interdistrict segregation and the specific causation
requirement. United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Indianapolis, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th
Cir. 1980). Likewise, the basic existence of any significant demographic shifts has presented an
insurmountable barrier for plaintiffs in sustaining desegregative school assignments. See, e.g.,
NAACP, Jacksonville Branch v. Duval Cnty. Sch., 273 F.3d 960, 971 (11th Cir. 2001); Lockett
v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 1997). On remand in
Missouri v. Jenkins, the district court and Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs presented
sufficient evidence to connect the achievement gap to past segregation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 122
F.3d 588, 598–99 (8th Cir. 1997). Yet the courts sustained this conclusion largely by use of the
Keyes presumption, rather than the impossible evidence the Supreme Court had seemed to
demand. Id. at 593, 598. Moreover, other courts have refused to apply the presumption to the
achievement gap. Coal. to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ. of Del., 90 F.3d 752, 776–77
(3d Cir.1996); United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214, 222 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
78. See supra note 77.
79. See generally GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT 50: KING’S DREAM OR
PLESSY’S NIGHTMARE? 2, 8 (2004).
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connection between particular educational policies or programs and
student outcomes. Yet advocates have still struggled to make this
connection in these areas and, thus, the movements have been
significantly limited.
The educational rights of English Language Learners (ELL) provide
the first example. ELL rights revolve almost entirely around the courts’
application of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA), which
obligates school districts “to take appropriate action to overcome
language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its
instructional programs.” 80 While the statutory language clearly
establishes an affirmative duty to assist ELL students, exactly what
schools must do is unclear. 81 Once a district takes some action, issues of
causation immediately arise. Plaintiffs must establish that a district’s
current program is causing diminished achievement or failing to elevate
students’ achievement to the appropriate level. This showing is nearly
impossible as a practical matter.
The causal question is embedded in the basic three-prong test for
evaluating ELL programs articulated in Castaneda v. Pickard. 82 The
first two prongs address whether a district’s ELL program is based on
an educational theory and whether the district has actually implemented
that theory. 83 A district, however, need not establish academic
consensus in regard to the educational theory, only some academic
support. 84 As a result, these first two prongs can be relatively cursory. 85
The third prong tests whether the ELL program is, in fact, effective in
helping students overcome language barriers. 86 This third inquiry
directly implicates the causal connection between the ELL program and
student outcomes.
As in desegregation, the party that bears the burden of proof on this
causal connection will most likely lose because too many variables and
too much uncertainty are involved. Currently, that burden falls on

80. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (2006) (emphasis added).
81. Memorandum, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Policy Update on Schools’ Obligations Toward
National Origin Minority Students With Limited-English Proficiency (Sept. 27, 1991), available
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/lau1991.html (indicating that a language
program should be implemented, but “most court decisions in this area stop short of providing
OCR [the Office of Civil Rights] and recipient institutions with specific guidance”).
82. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 1009–10.
84. Id. at 1009.
85. Eric Haas, The Equal Educational Opportunity Act 30 Years Later: Time to Revisit
“Appropriate Action” for Assisting English Language Learners, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 361, 362, 387
(2005); see, e.g., Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 307
F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002).
86. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1010.
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plaintiffs in ELL cases. 87 If ELL students have regressed or made no
progress after being exposed to the district’s program, their ability to
state a claim might be relatively easy. But if students have made some
progress—which is almost inevitable, regardless of the district’s
action—plaintiffs will struggle to establish that the progress they made
was in spite of the ELL program and, thus, legally insufficient. 88
The problem is intertwined with districts’ extensive discretion under
Castaneda in selecting an ELL program. That discretion makes
identifying a baseline group against which to measure the students’
achievement an elusive objective. 89 The fact that students might be
performing significantly better in other programs that take a different
pedagogical approach is of limited, if any, relevance because, under
Castaneda, the district is free to adopt any program that has theoretical
support. 90 And comparing the challenged district to others with the
same program can be circular. If the program chosen by the district is
simply pedagogically inferior as a general matter, then comparing it to
other pedagogically inferior districts is largely pointless. Performing at
or above the level of these equally inferior programs does not mean that
the challenged program is effective. Only the worst of the worst would
actually reveal themselves as ineffective under this analysis. In short,
because Castaneda does not qualitatively evaluate programs as a class
in any meaningful way, plaintiffs in ineffective programs are forced to
compare their achievement to students in other ineffective programs.
Doing so ignores what may be the real causal factor in their low
achievement—the program itself—and instead focuses on the
possibility that the challenged district is ineffective in carrying out the
program.
The experience of advocates reveals that this problem is not just
theoretical. Plaintiffs have almost uniformly been unable to overcome
the causal problems posed by the Castaneda standard. 91 So long as a
district takes some action for which there is some pedagogical support,
a plaintiff’s claim is likely to fail. 92 Furthermore, because plaintiffs
cannot easily resolve the causal burdens they bear, districts are largely
free to adopt any ELL program they want with no qualitative check
87. Id. at 1000.
88. See, e.g., Quiroz v. State Bd. of Educ., No. Civ. S-97-1600WBS/GGH, 1997 WL
661163, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (“Castaneda provides no guidance in determining what
standards a court should use in evaluating an educational plan. Because it ‘is surely beyond the
competence of this court to fashion its own measure of academic achievement’ the court
approaches this prong with ‘great trepidation.’”) (quoting Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch.
Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 715 (N.D. Cal. 1989)).
89. See id.
90. 648 F.2d at 1009–10.
91. See, e.g., Teresa P., 724 F. Supp. at 715–16.
92. Haas, supra note 85, at 387.
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through litigation. 93 In this respect, the Castaneda standard can render
ELL services a right without a remedy.
The longstanding litigation over Arizona’s ELL programs served as
a meaningful exception for some time.94 The litigation had avoided
causal pitfalls by focusing on state-level support of district-level policy,
rather than local policy itself. 95 The plaintiffs argued that the state was
acting arbitrarily toward districts that were attempting to implement
their obligations pursuant to the EEOA and Castaneda. 96 Accepting this
theory, the district court had ordered the state to provide remedies for
nearly a decade. 97
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Horne v. Flores, 98 however,
revealed that, even at the state level, causal questions remain dominant.
The Court rejected the district court’s finding that the persistent
achievement gap between ELL students and native speakers was
attributable to inadequate funding or the low quality of ELL educational
programs. 99 The Court indicated that the causal inquiry was far more
complex than the district court recognized. Thus, on remand, the Court
instructed the district court to focus on two distinct causal questions.
First, it directed the lower court to closely examine variables unrelated
to the ELL program itself that might explain the achievement gap, such
as “the difficulty of teaching English to older students (many of whom,
presumably, were not in English-speaking schools as younger students)
and problems such as drug use and the prevalence of gangs.” 100 The
Court’s obvious assumption was that the achievement gap was
attributable to student and family factors rather than schools. Second,
the Court questioned whether funding—much less incremental increases
in it—bears any relationship to the quality of an ELL program. 101 The
Court indicated that the plaintiffs must establish that money has a causal
effect on educational quality, that educational quality has an effect on
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1167 (D. Ariz. 2007); Flores v.
Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1113 (D. Ariz. 2005); Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225,
1225–27 (D. Ariz. 2000).
95. Flores, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1238.
96. Id. at 1239.
97. The court first ordered a remedy in 2000. Id. at 1240.
98. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2605 (2009) (holding that to determine whether
a school district violated the EEOC, the court must consider not only the funding level of the
ELL program and the achievement of the students in the program, but also changed
circumstances related to the ELL population and any other means aside from increased funding
that the State was employing to improve ELL instruction and student performance).
99. Id. at 2588–89.
100. Id. at 2605 n.20.
101. Id. at 2603; see also Eric A. Hanushek, The Failure of Input-Based Schooling
Policies, 113 ECON. J. F64, F69–F70 (2003) (reviewing U.S. data regarding funding and school
performance).
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achievement, and that the achievement gap between ELL and other
students is not caused by outside factors. 102
In sum, ELL students, without question, have the right to
educational services that assist them in overcoming language barriers.
By placing districts on notice of their affirmative obligation to take
some action, ELL students have seen an expansion of programs beyond
what existed prior to the EEOA. But ELL claims involve causal gaps
that make enforcing the qualitative aspects of this right nearly
impossible. The Castaneda standard affords districts so much discretion
that plaintiffs are unable to establish that a district’s program—even a
poor one—is the cause of educational failure. Similarly, even a state’s
refusal to significantly support ELL programs will go unchecked unless
a plaintiff can somehow control for numerous variables and causally
connect state policy to student outcomes. As a result, the initial promise
of affirmative rights has been stymied by causal uncertainty.
C. Poverty and School Finance Litigation
1. Causation as a Limit on Past Reform
School finance litigation has faced the same problem of attributing
student outcomes to school inputs as other reform movements, but at a
much higher level. The question has not been whether a particular
program in a particular school or classroom affects the outcomes for
particular students, but whether a statewide system of school financing
affects school quality and student outcomes. As Professor Michael
Rebell writes, in almost every state school finance case, “the question of
whether ‘money matters’ has been a central legal issue [that
precipitated] extensive expert testimony on . . . technical economic and
social science issues.” 103 Notwithstanding school finance litigation’s
relative success in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, both its
initial and continuing limitations have been a function of an uncertain
causal connection.
Early on, this causal gap forestalled school finance equality
altogether and, in fact, contributed to the effective end of federal
litigation. Plaintiffs initially pursued school finance reform under the
theory that the Federal Equal Protection Clause prohibits certain
inequalities. 104 In San Antonio Independent School District v.

102. Horne, 129 S. Ct. at 2600–06 (reviewing factors that must be considered on remand
before a judgment can be made as to whether the school district was taking “appropriate
action”).
103. Rebell, supra note 25, at 1484.
104. Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 493, 497 (1995).
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Rodriguez, 105 the Supreme Court rejected the claim on numerous
grounds, but its concern regarding the causal connection between
money and educational quality was clear. Even if students had a
fundamental interest in education, the Court indicated that a causal flaw
pervaded plaintiffs’ claim. The Court wrote: “On even the most basic
questions in this area the scholars and educational experts are divided.
Indeed, one of the major sources of controversy concerns the extent to
which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational
expenditures and the quality of education.” 106 The Court further
indicated that the lower court had incorrectly “assumed [a] correlation
[in] . . . virtually every legal conclusion” it drew regarding money. 107
This rejection of school finance litigation on both legal and factual
grounds effectively ended the movement in federal courts.
Plaintiffs responded by pressing claims in state courts under state
constitutions.108 State constitutions offered a different legal paradigm,
but the uncertainty of the causal connection between money and
educational outcomes remained. The way each respective state court has
dealt with the causal uncertainty has largely dictated the outcome of
finance reform in the state. As a general matter, state courts have
addressed the problem in one of three ways: (1) rejecting claims based
on the lack of a clear causal connection; 109 (2) acknowledging the lack
of consensus on the causal question, but determining that the weight of
the overall social science or the evidence in a particular state is
sufficient to establish a causal connection; 110 or (3) simplifying the
inquiry by ignoring whether money correlates with particular outcomes
and, instead, inferring a causal connection to those outcomes based on
the fact that money buys access to certain tangible resources. 111
The Colorado Supreme Court exemplifies the first category, which
rejects plaintiffs’ claims based on insufficient evidence of a causal
connection between money and educational outcomes. In Lujan v.
Colorado State Board of Education, 112 the court refused to seriously
entertain the plaintiffs’ claims, simply asserting that “a raging
controversy” persists over whether “there is a direct correlation between
school financing and educational quality and opportunity.” 113 Absent
evidence “that equal educational opportunity requires equal
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
Underwood, supra note 104, at 498.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982).
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 406 (N.J. 1990).
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976).
649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982).
Id. at 1018.
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expenditures for each school child,” judicial intervention in school
finance would amount to “social policy under the guise that there is a
fundamental right to education.” 114 Other courts have gone deeper into
the factual and causal issues, but still come to the same conclusion
regarding the causal connection. For instance, the Georgia Supreme
Court found that the state’s funding scheme created unequal access to
certain resources, but refused to conclude that this inequality had a
causal effect on the quality of education in particular districts or
negatively impacted student outcomes. 115
A significant number of courts fall into the second category, which
finds a causal connection between money and outcomes. 116 Courts in
this group, however, differ in the quality of evidence upon which they
base this conclusion. Several courts have concluded that money is
causally connected to school quality or student outcomes based on
social science and statistical evidence, 117 while others are content to
reach the same conclusion in the absence of any hard evidence. In fact,
some courts suggest that such a causal connection should not matter.
Courts taking this approach blur the line between courts that find an
evidentiary causal connection and courts that infer a causal connection
based on the simple notion that money buys resources.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, for instance, clearly falls into the
category of concluding that money matters, 118 but expresses serious
ambivalence regarding the evidentiary basis for a causal connection. In
Abbott v. Burke, 119 the court admitted that “controversy abounds” and
that the “research, while promising and constructive, [is] inconclusive,
at least on the underlying issue before us” regarding whether money
improves educational outcomes. 120 The research, the court wrote, is
clear “that money alone has not worked,” and that some strategies have
shown promise even without money. 121 The court, however,
distinguished itself from courts in the first category—those that reject
114. Id.
115. McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160–61 (Ga. 1981).
116. Rebell, supra note 25, at 1484–85 (finding that twenty-nine out of the thirty courts
that examined the question have “determined that money does indeed matter”).
117. See, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 389 (Vt. 1997); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *49–50 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003).
118. In fact, this court has the most ardent commitment to this principle in the country. Its
first decision was Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 276–77 (1973). The New Jersey Supreme
Court issued its twentieth decision in this line of cases in 2009 in Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989,
991–92 (N.J. 2009). For a discussion of the various remedies ordered by the court, see Paul L.
Tractenberg, The Evolution and Implementation of Educational Rights Under the New Jersey
Constitution of 1947, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 827, 917, 926–28 (1998).
119. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
120. Id. at 404.
121. Id.
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plaintiffs’ claims—by refusing to surrender to the lack of causal
certainty and indicating that, while research may not have uniformly
shown a positive causal connection, “it does not show that money
makes no difference.” 122 This conclusion, combined with the fact that
students have an affirmative right to education in that state, prompted
the New Jersey court to resort to what amounted to a presumption in
favor of the plaintiffs’ causal claim. “[W]hile we are unable to conclude
from this record that the State is clearly wrong,” the court wrote,
denying plaintiffs relief would “strip all notions of equal and adequate
funding from the constitutional obligation unless we were convinced
that the State was clearly right.” 123 That the court was willing to err on
the plaintiffs’ side in regard to this causal question was clear when it
wrote:
[E]ven if not a cure, money will help, and [ ] these students
are constitutionally entitled to that help.
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and
efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are
entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of
money as their competitors. 124
In short, that plaintiffs have succeeded in cases where the evidence
regarding the causal connection is front and center does not mean the
issue has been resolved. The causal problem is always lurking, and is
largely kept at bay not by the evidence, but by the way in which courts
approach it.
The last category of courts stands alone in avoiding the causal
problem, but has done so only by ignoring it altogether or framing a
much simpler inquiry. For instance, the California Supreme Court in
Serrano v. Priest 125 upheld a challenge to the state’s school finance
scheme, 126 but relegated the causal issue to a single footnote, indicating
that the differing scholarly findings were irrelevant. 127 Rather than
substantively address the issue, the court simply took the plaintiffs’
allegations that money affected quality as true, and noted “that the
several courts which have considered contentions [to the contrary] have
uniformly rejected them.” 128 But the Serrano court’s citations regarding
other courts’ conclusions are unpersuasive. The other courts’ rejections
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1253 n.16.
Id.
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of the argument that money does not matter were not necessarily based
on evidence. In fact, at least two of those courts based their conclusions
on intuitive inferences or assumptions, concluding, for instance, that
money affected quality because “[p]resumably, students receiving a
$1000 education are better educated tha[n] those acquiring a $600
schooling.” 129
In a second appeal in the Serrano litigation, 130 the court devoted
slightly more analysis to the causal connection, but still ignored the
possibility that there was an evidentiary gap. This time the court gave
no hint of the debate, asserting in conclusory fashion that a causal
connection existed. Without explanation or citation to authority, it wrote
that “[s]ubstantial disparities in expenditures per pupil among school
districts cause and perpetuate substantial disparities in the quality and
extent of availability of educational opportunities.” 131 Similarly, it flatly
asserted that “differences in dollars do produce differences in pupil
achievement.” 132 Ultimately, the court’s only basis for finding a
connection was to infer a connection based on the undeniable fact that
the current financing system afforded wealthier districts an advantage in
obtaining quality teachers, staff, equipment, and facilities. 133 Of course,
the evidentiary question that courts in the other categories struggle with
is not this simple one, but rather whether these differences amount to
meaningful differences in educational quality and achievement.
Unsurprisingly, those courts falling into the first category uniformly
reject school finance claims, and those falling into the second and third
categories tend to uphold school finance challenges. Yet virtually no
court is immune to ambivalence regarding the causal connection. At
best, those in the third category hide their ambivalence by refusing to
discuss the evidence. In short, a significant causal gap pervades all
school finance cases, and the differing outcomes in the cases are not a
product of differing evidence, but of courts’ willingness to tolerate
uncertainty regarding the evidence.

129. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d sub nom. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); see also Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 477, 479 (1971);
Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (“[I]t may be that in the abstract ‘the
difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality of
education.’ But this abstract statement must give way to proof [that spending differentials result
in] actual educational advantages in the high-cost schools, especially with respect to the caliber
of the teaching staff.”).
130. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
131. Id. at 939.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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2. Causation as the Means to End Current School Finance
Even in those several states where school finance litigation has been
successful and causal uncertainties purportedly resolved, the end or
severe limitation of the movement remains a serious risk. The 2008
financial crisis placed immense pressure on state and local budgets.
Some localities were nearly insolvent, and the rest faced “the biggest
cutbacks they’ve seen in decades.” 134 Only the influx of $53.6 billion in
federal stimulus and emergency aid avoided educational catastrophe
during the last two years. 135 With no more aid readily forthcoming,
school districts have been fully confronting the harsh reality of falling
state revenues that required staggering budget cuts. 136 Thirty-four states
and the District Columbia have already made enormous cuts to public
schools, some approaching one billion dollars. 137 Cuts of this sort have
prompted claims that some states are failing to meet their state
constitutional obligations in regard to education. 138
These outside pressures are of the very sort that can force a
reexamination of the underlying causal question in school finance.
Courts that do not want to find themselves compromised by the
collision of legal rights and practical reality can extricate themselves by
demanding precise evidence of the causal connection at the center of
plaintiffs’ claims. While many of these courts have previously found a
causal connection, they based their findings on simplistic reasoning or
134. Anne Marie Chaker, K-12 Schools Slashing Costs, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2008,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122895665184096557.html.
135. Education Jobs Fund, Pub. L. No. 111–226 (2010) (allocating ten billion dollars
during 2010–11 to save education jobs); U.S. Dept. Educ., State Fiscal Stabilization Fund,
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/factsheet/stabilization-fund.html (last visited Aug.
24, 2012) (detailing the need for and disbursement of education funds as part of the larger
economic stimulus bill of 2009).
136. Associated Press, Record Number of Calif. Districts Struggling to Pay Bills, EDUC.
WEEK, June 30, 2010; Tamar Lewin & Sam Dillon, Districts Warn of Deeper Teacher Cuts,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010; Eric A. Hanushek, Cry Wolf! This Budget Crunch Is for Real, EDUC.
WEEK, May 19, 2010; Leslie A. Maxwell, K-12 Cuts Loom Again as States’ Fiscal Woes
Continue, With Budget Gaps Growing, About Half Expect K-12 Cuts, ED WEEK (March 30,
2010).
137. Jane Stancill, Teachers Protest N.C. Budget Cuts, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 4, 2011);
Nicholas Johnson et al., An Update on State Budget Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1214.
138. David Harrison, New Budget Cuts Threaten School Funding Settlements, STATELINE
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.seniorwomen.com/news/index.php/stateline-new-budget-cuts-threate
n-school-funding-settlements (discussing the problems that diminished educational funds create
for complying with a past state finance settlement); Anthony Ramirez, Further Education Cuts
Spur Fear of Lawsuits, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 23, 2010 (discussing the potential for a lawsuit in
Nevada as a result of education cuts); Michael A. Rebell, Litigation Strategies for Hard
Economic Times (December 17, 2010), http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/litigation/12-2010S
tateline.php3.
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general principles derived from social science, not necessarily specific
state-level causal evidence. Moreover, plaintiffs may be in an even
worse position today than before because courts and advocates have in
increasing numbers relied on standardized test scores in making out
their claims. 139 Where standardized test scores were used to prove a
violation, it is only a matter of time before courts examine the effect of
past remedies on these scores. 140 Yet, given the intractable causal gaps
seen elsewhere, plaintiffs may find themselves unable to defend against
this attack.
In effect, educational advocates have leveraged test score failures
into education finance litigation success. 141 Without question, student
achievement on standardized tests is relevant to educational adequacy.
But that test scores are relevant does not mean that they resolve the
question of whether students are receiving an adequate education.
NCLB’s apparent attempt to reduce educational quality to test scores,
and states’ curricular and statutory movements in this direction, signal
that this distinction is getting lost. If this occurs, plaintiffs will be at the
mercy of the courts. As Professor James Ryan has argued, plaintiffs
perceive this move as being to their benefit, but it can backfire. Rather
than leading “a court to order increased funding, poor test scores might
just trigger an inquiry into whether the disparities in test scores relate to
insufficient funding. Plaintiffs will succeed in their quest for funding if,
but only if, that causal link can be established.” 142 Thus, the centrality
of test scores simply opens up the core causal problems that have been
unresolvable elsewhere. Plaintiffs will be unable to demonstrate that a
precise amount of increased funding leads to a precise increase, if any,
in test scores. This evidentiary gap, rather than any flaw in plaintiffs’
139. For instance, in the seminal 1989 adequacy case, Rose v. Council for Better
Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), the Kentucky Supreme Court wrote that “achievement
test scores in the poorer districts are lower than those in the richer districts and expert opinion
clearly established that there is a correlation between those scores and the wealth of the district.”
Id. at 197. Courts in other states have followed, explicitly indicating that test scores were an
appropriate factor for assessing the constitutionality of their school systems. See Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259
(N.C. 1997); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (identifying
assessments as an element of adequacy, but finding low test scores alone do not indicate
inadequacy). Some courts have gone so far as to treat test scores as equivalent to a prima facie
indicator. See Lake View Sch. Dist. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 488–89 (Ark. 2002) (stating
that test scores are a “serious problem”); Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963,
at *47 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2003) (“Kansas test results are informative and disturbingly
telling.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 752 (N.H. 2002).
140. See Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673.
141. Id. at 338; James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2008); ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A
POLICY PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2008).
142. Ryan, supra note 141, at 1243.
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claim or merit of the state’s education system, can end or seriously
constrain school finance reform in the courts.
The recent financial crisis and the slow exit from it only make this
scenario more likely. New claims will place the judiciary in an
increasingly precarious situation. Most of the previous decisions
recognizing education rights were issued during times of relative
economic prosperity. 143 Today, courts are faced with demanding that
state legislatures devote a larger portion of an already shrunken overall
state budget to education, demanding that they raise taxes, treating
students’ constitutional right to education as contingent, or articulating
less robust rights. Ordering financial remedies would test the
institutional capacity of courts, while backing away from precedent
might permanently undercut existing rights. 144 Either option would
shrink educational opportunity.
These unenviable options will place pressure on the courts to find
other ways out of the litigation. The rising importance of test scores in
school finance litigation can provide an easy exit strategy. Educational
advocates are in no better position than any other education reform
movement to demonstrate a causal connection between money and
educational outcomes as measured on standardized tests. In fact, given
the extensive research devoted to this very question and its failure to
produce conclusive and specific results, school finance litigation
advocates could be in a worse position. The point here is not to criticize,
but simply to diagnose and warn. School finance litigation’s most
consistent success has come through its ability to assess adequacy and
equality in terms of education inputs, with only tangential attention to
causal effects on educational outcomes such as test scores. NCLB and
the financial crisis create pressures to shift this balance. This shift could
reverse school finance reform’s trajectory, just as it has elsewhere. 145
D. Students with Disabilities
To the extent that there is an exception to causation’s negative
impact on education reform movements, it may be in special education.
143. See, e.g., Rebell, supra note 25, at 1499–1500 (recounting the success of school
finance litigation during the 1990s and the following decade).
144. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 844–45 (Ala. 2002).
145. Recent scholarship, however, offers one important caveat. Professors Charles Sabel
and William Simon suggest that modern public litigation has moved beyond the model offered
by Professor Abram Chayes in the 1970s. They conclude that public law litigation can
destabilize public structures that work to plaintiffs’ disadvantage. The litigation helps plaintiffs
gain a seat at the table of policy formation. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destablization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1018–21
(2004). In this respect, school finance litigation might not present unreasonable challenges to the
current system, but may simply force it to account for schools’ needs as it navigates through this
crisis.
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Certain categories of special education claims have avoided the causal
problems that have plagued other education claims, but this exception is
primarily a function of the fact that so many special education rights are
procedural rather than substantive in nature. 146 The Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) guarantees students access to a
free and appropriate public education, which includes specialized
educational services in many instances. 147 This right is a substantive
right. The majority of the Act, however, deals not with the substance of
these educational services, but with the numerous and precise
procedures that schools must follow in delivering these services. 148
While parents surely have substantive complaints about the quality of
the educational services their children receive, school districts more
often struggle to comply with the procedural aspects of the Act. In fact,
some courts never reach the merits of the educational services
themselves because the procedural violations are so egregious, or
sufficient in and of themselves, that they warrant relief. 149
Procedural rights, as opposed to substantive rights, avoid causal
problems for at least two reasons. First, procedural rights are
unambiguously affirmative, whereas the rights implicated in
desegregation, for instance, are negative. 150 Students do not have a right
to integrated schools, but only a right to be free from discrimination.151
Establishing that a school has failed to deliver an affirmative right is
simple in comparison to establishing the existence of discrimination. In
effect, with affirmative rights, the absence of beneficial action by the
school means the student wins. 152 With negative rights, the burden is on
146. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional
Children in Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 81,
93 (2000) (“[C]ompliance with special education mandates is often focused on meeting
procedural requirements as opposed to outcome goals.”).
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (guaranteeing a free appropriate education); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412 (2006) (requiring individualized education plans); 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (2006) (listing the
special services on which funds may be spent).
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (detailing various procedural protections).
149. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 564 F. Supp. 166, 169
(D.D.C.1983) (finding District of Columbia Public Schools obligated to fund private placement
where it fails “to provide the necessary procedural safeguards in processing requests for special
education”); M.M. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 437 F.3d 1085, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the failure to comply with IDEA procedural protections justified relief).
150. See generally Meredith Lee Bryant, Combating School Resegregation Through
Housing: A Need for a Reconceptualization of American Democracy and the Rights It Protects,
13 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 156–59 (1997) (discussing the negative rights
conceptualization of school desegregation); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 872, 885, 888 (1986).
151. See Bryant, supra note 150, at 166 (arguing that the Court betrayed its early
commitments to desegregation and returned to a purely negative rights view).
152. See id.
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the plaintiff, who must establish a wrongful act by the school, and the
absence of any evidence means the school wins. 153 Second, procedural
rights avoid causal problems because the vindication of procedural
violations does not rest upon evidence of educational harm per se, at
least not in special education. The legal harm is the deprivation of the
procedure itself, not the substantive educational right the procedure is
designed to protect. 154 Thus, causation is effectively irrelevant, as the
harm and its causation are necessarily embodied in the failure to follow
procedure.
Yet, even with the benefit of various affirmative and procedural
obligations, 155 some students can still experience causal problems under
IDEA. For instance, the pure question of whether a student actually has
a disability implicates causal issues and precedes many procedural
obligations. Most notably, a parent might believe that his child’s
academic problems are caused by a disability, but a school, not inclined
to provide the requisite services, might assert that the academic
problems are caused by other factors. 156 At this early stage, the school is
in a far better position to win because of the inherent difficulty of the
causal inquiry. 157 Thus, it is not surprising that parents frequently
encounter school district resistance at this stage as opposed to later. 158

153. See id.
154. See, e.g., M.M., 437 F.3d at 1097–98 (finding that the failure to comply with IDEA
procedural protections would justify a monetary award for parents). Congress has attempted to
curtail the procedural requirements of the Act, particularly those related to paperwork. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1408 (2006).
155. Even the substantive aspects of IDEA have a procedural bent to them, whereby
causation is irrelevant and harm is assumed. If a student can establish that a school did not offer
the appropriate services, courts will award damages for the value of those services or
compensatory services without inquiring as to the effect on the student. See, e.g., Forest Grove
Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2496 (2009). In effect, the student is harmed by the
deprivation of the service itself, not by any differential educational outcome. Moreover, because
the deprivation of the service is a violation, some courts permit students to attach emotional and
other compensatory damages to the deprivation. See Mark C. Weber, Damages Liability in
Special Education Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 83, 83–84 (2002).
156. See, e.g., Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. A.D. ex rel. Patricia F., 503 F.3d 378, 384 (5th
Cir. 2007); N.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
157. See P.J. v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 1999 WL 1054599, at *3 (7th Cir. 1999)
(indicating that the student’s improved academic performance during the year and pediatrician’s
finding that he was not learning-disabled were sufficient bases for the school to determine he
was not in need of special education); Rodiriecus L. v. Waukegan Sch., 90 F.3d 249, 254 (7th
Cir. 1996) (finding no basis for school to suspect disability when student’s academic
performance was average and student’s guardian never requested special education services);
Katherine May, By Reason Thereof: Causation and Eligibility Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 173, 185 (2009).
158. May, supra note 157, at 185.
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Likewise, when individuals have asserted educational disability
claims outside of federal law and its procedural protections, causal
problems become even more obvious. For instance, when parents have
brought educational malpractice claims involving disability
classification or a student’s specific special education placement, the
harm to the student comes to the forefront and presents causal problems.
Even if a plaintiff can establish that a special education classification or
placement itself was substantively incorrect—which is no small feat—
the plaintiff must still establish that this classification or placement
caused educational harm to the student to sustain retroactive relief.159
Just as in ELL cases, plaintiffs would need to demonstrate that the
educational failure was attributable to the school’s actions, rather than
some other factor. While the school’s actions may be a partial cause, a
student’s academic achievement or failure—as in other education
paradigms—rarely occurs in a vacuum, and can be affected by various
other factors. 160 Sorting these factors out in the absence of a reasonable
baseline indicating what the child would have achieved in a different
program or with a proper classification implicates the same causal
problems and speculations as in other educational paradigms.
In short, while many disability claims provide an exception to the
causal problems that typically pervade education reform, this exception
proves this Article’s overall theory. The exceptions in disability law are
limited to claims involving procedural violations, which themselves are
unique because they involve affirmative rights. In contrast, those
disability claims that go to the substance of students’ rights tend to
implicate the same causal inquiries that arise in any other movement
and present significant barriers to students seeking relief.
E. No Child Left Behind Act
The causal flaws of educational civil rights, moreover, are not
simply a function of the litigation process. Although litigation tends to
accentuate the problem, the primary flaw is resting educational reform
entirely on a causal assertion, regardless of the forum. The No Child
Left Behind Act provides an almost audacious example of these same
problems in statutory and regulatory reform. The Act’s stated purpose
was “to ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and significant
159. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska
1981) (“The level of success which might have been achieved had the mistakes not been made
will, we believe, be necessarily incapable of assessment, rendering legal cause an
imponderable.”); Smith v. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941 (Cal.
3d Ct. App. 1979) (indicating precedent had rejected such claims because of “the difficulties of
assessing the wrongs and injuries involved”).
160. See, e.g., May, supra note 157, at 182–85 (discussing the causal problems involved in
determining whether a student’s academic problems are related to a disability).
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opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum,
proficiency on challenging State academic achievement standards and
state academic assessments.” 161 More specifically, the Act was designed
to close the achievement gap for poor and minority students and end
what President George W. Bush termed the “soft bigotry of low
expectations.” 162 The Act would achieve this through an accountability
system demanding that states set high academic standards for all
students; test students yearly in core content areas; disaggregate test
scores by race, poverty, and other factors; and sanction schools that
failed to meet proficiency benchmarks. 163 The ultimate requirement was
that 95% of students, including 95% of students in individual subgroups, reach proficiency in every school by 2014. 164
The Act dug its own grave by requiring that these unquestionably
high achievement goals be met within a definite time frame, 165 and
premising their attainment on a causal connection between standardized
testing and improved student achievement. Unlike previous legislation,
it sought to address educational failures not by creating entitlements to
resources or even discretionarily driving funds toward particular
educational inputs, but by expanding achievement assessment
systems. 166 The expansion of assessment was relatively easy to achieve,
as was the assertion of high expectations, but fairly meeting those
expectations has proven unrealistic. All states instituted the standards
and tests, but absent blatant manipulation of the tests the proficiency
level goals would not be met, nor would the less-emphasized stipulation
that all students be taught by highly qualified teachers occur. 167 More
than 80% of schools were set to be labeled as failing in the fall of
2012. 168 The achievement gap between minority and white children or
between poor and middle-income children has not significantly
decreased, nor has any widespread increase in scores occurred. 169 And
161. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
162. Sam Dillon, Democrats Make Bush School Act an Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/us/politics/23child.html.
163. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
164. The Act technically requires schools to move toward 100% proficiency, but only
requires that 95% of students be tested. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(E)–(H) (2006).
165. Id.
166. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1) (2006).
167. See generally NAOMI CHUDOWSKY & VIC CHUDOWSKY, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, MANY
STATES HAVE TAKEN A “BACKLOADED” APPROACH TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND GOAL OF ALL
STUDENTS SCORING “PROFICIENT” (May 2008); SHELBY DIETZ AND MALINI ROY, CTR. ON EDUC.
POL’Y, HOW MANY SCHOOLS HAVE NOT MADE ADEQUATE YEARLY PROGRESS UNDER THE NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT? (August 2010).
168. Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html?adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxn
nlx=1346024945-bv7UdeFstkq3JHBLrprr8Q.
169. ANNA HABAS ROWAN ET AL., EDUC. TRUST, GAUGING THE GAPS: A DEEPER LOOK AT
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in regard to high-quality teachers, the effect has been minimal at best in
the neediest schools. 170
These results mark NCLB as an enormous failure in the public’s
eyes, and stem from the master narrative surrounding its enactment that
based its efficacy on an inherently problematic causal connection. In
essence, NCLB was premised on the assertion that standardized testing
and accountability would raise student achievement in general and close
the achievement gap. 171 No significant research supported that
conclusion. 172 At best, the experience of a few states that had
implemented their own testing and accountability systems coincided
with some educational gains. 173 But the reforms in those states were not
limited to testing and accountability; they were part of larger education
reforms. 174 Moreover, while these states experienced meaningful
educational advances, they did not elevate all students to proficiency,175
nor did the large achievement gaps between white and minority students
vanish. 176 In short, NCLB promised results that it had no basis for
believing it could deliver.
The Act’s causal assertion, more than its actual function and results,
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 2–3 (2010), http://www.edtrust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/
files/NAEP%20Gap_0.pdf. But see NAOMI CHUDOWSKY ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, STATE
TEST SCORE TRENDS THROUGH 2007-08, PART 1: IS THE EMPHASIS ON “PROFICIENCY”
SHORTCHANGING HIGHER- AND LOWER-ACHIEVING STUDENTS 1 (2009).
170. Sarah Almy & Christian Theokas, EDUC. TRUST, Not Prepared for Class: High
Poverty Schools Continue to Have Fewer In-Field Teachers 1, 2 (2010), http://www.ed
trust.org/sites/edtrust.org/files/publications/files/Not%20Prepared%20for%20Class.pdf; EDUC.
COMM’N OF THE STATES, ECS REPORT TO THE NATION: STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 69 (2004), http://www.ecs.org/html/Special/NCLB/ReportToTheNatio
n/docs/Report_to_the_Nation.pdf (indicating that no states were on track to meet the teacher
requirements).
171. Nicholas Lemann, Testing Limits: Can the President’s Education Crusade Survive
Beltway Politics?, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2001) (indicating the intent to aim the bill at a narrow
group of schools); Diana Jean Schemo, The New Administration: News Analysis; Schoolbook
Balancing Act, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2001) (excerpted Presidential speech).
172. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, COMMITTEE ON
INCENTIVES AND TEST-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 4-5 (Michael Hout &
Stuart W. Elliot eds., 2011); see also Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Volatility in School
Test Scores: Implications for Test-Based Accountability Systems, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUC.
POL’Y, 2002, at 235, 248, 253, 267–68.
173. Kane & Staiger, supra note 172, at 268.
174. See, e.g., W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 563, 565–66
(Tex. 2003) (recounting the history of education challenges in Texas); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 (Tex. 1995) (discussing the state standards system as a
response to and in the context of school finance reform).
175. David S. Broder, Long Road to Reform: Negotiators Forge Education Legislation,
WASHINGTON POST A01 (Dec. 17, 2001) (indicating that even North Carolina and Texas would
have been labeled failing under the initial version of the bill).
176. See ROWAN, supra note 169, at 2, 5; see also Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 559
S.E.2d 365, 392 (N.C. 2004) (discussing the lower court’s findings regarding achievement).
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was its undoing. Viewed as a measure that was intended to meet the
achievement levels it articulated, the Act was not simply a failure, but
seems almost ridiculous in retrospect. 177 The bill’s success, however,
need not have been tied to this causal assertion. In fact, those closest to
the bill may not have actually believed the assertion or seen it as the
primary purpose of the bill. 178 The White House and congressional
leaders appear to have incorporated the causal assertion in the bill’s
master narrative simply to rally support for it, when their actual
expectations were much lower. 179
The problem is that no one else seemed to appreciate this. The
earliest versions of the bill incited the fear of governors, who doubted
the credibility of the causal claim, and the spirited support of
congressional leaders, who believed wholeheartedly in the claim. 180 The
White House fell somewhere in between. While publicly trumpeting the
efficacy of testing and accountability, the White House quietly admitted
that one hundred percent proficiency was not possible, 181 and indicated
that its goal was to establish standards high enough to identify the worst
schools, but not so high that they condemned good schools as
failures. 182 The final version of the bill was a compromise that retained
high proficiency goals and explicit accountability for meeting those
goals, but included several safety valves that would allow states or the
Department of Education to mask the lack of meaningful
improvement. 183 The assertion that testing and accountability would
177. See See Matthew D. Knepper, Comment, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of the
No Child Left Behind Act’s One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and its Consequences, 53
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 907-08 (2009).
178. Chester E. Finn, Jr., Leaving Education Reform Behind, WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 14,
2002) (indicating that the real effect of the bill was to require regular testing, but as to defining
and meeting proficiency the bill gave states broad flexibility); The President’s Big Test,
FRONTLINE (March 28, 2002), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/schools/nochild/
lemann.html (interviewing Nicholas Lemann, who characterizes the bill as a step toward a
nationalized curriculum, and distinguishes the bill’s details from its rhetoric); Lorraine Woellert,
Why the Education Bill Is Likely to Fail, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 25, 2001)
(indicating that the “heart of the bill” was really about driving reform in the long term); see also
James E. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the PostDesegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703, 1731–32 (2003) (finding that the bill
creates the conditions for change rather than change itself).
179. FRONTLINE, supra note 178.
180. See id.; Woellert, supra note 178 (criticizing the bill for not being tough enough);
Diana Jean Schemo, Bush Seems to Ease His Stance on the Accountability of Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2001) (noting that the House version of the bill was far more strict).
181. Schemo, supra note 180; see Michael D. Barolsky, High Schools Are Not Highways:
How Dole Frees States from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 725, 730–31 (2008).
182. Schemo, supra note 180.
183. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3)(A) (2006) (setting proficiency goals of 100%), with
20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(3), (c) (2006) (allowing states to develop their own assessments and
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improve education and close the achievement gap, however, remained
the dominant narrative, 184 while the safety valves went largely
unnoticed. The safety valves represent an uneasiness or disbelief in the
Act’s causal assertion and further suggest that the master narrative was
simply part of selling the bill to the public and prompting state
compliance. Knowing the Act could not produce full proficiency, those
closest to the Act likely harbored a much narrower and more subtle set
of goals. 185 Measured by these narrower, noncausal goals, the Act was
arguably a smashing success, but a full discussion of those goals would
warrant its own paper. 186
In the end, even the safety valves proved insufficient to save the
Act. The Act was simply too closely tied with its flawed causal
assertion, the failure of which could not escape the public’s eye.
Meeting the Act’s requirements may simply have required too much test
manipulation for it to be seen as anything other than that. Parents,
schools, and states knew they could not realistically meet the Act’s
requirements long before they had technically failed and, consequently,
simply awaited the Act’s deadlines, betting that Congress or the
Department of Education would admit the flaw. Ultimately, few
recognized or openly admitted the flaw. Only an eleventh hour
statutory waiver by the Secretary of Education this past fall saved 80%
of the nation’s school districts from demonstrating the failure of this
causal assertion and the severe sanctions that would have been

proficiency levels). See also FRONTLINE, supra note 178; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at
1724.
184. FRONTLINE, supra note 178.
185. Infra note 186
186. First, the Act required states to align their curriculum with their standardized
assessments, and test students yearly. Prior to the Act, only nine states had aligned their
curriculum and tests, and only fifteen tested students yearly. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178,
at 1731. Today, all fifty states are doing both. EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, supra note 170.
This was the only requirement in the Act that states could not avoid and, thus, possibly the Act’s
primary goal. A byproduct of this testing has been the development of a rudimentary national
concept of an adequate education, as well as significant movement toward a nationalized
curriculum. See Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). Second, rather than actually close
the achievement gap, the Act’s goal could have been merely to identify and draw attention to it,
which it has done. See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1715; Linda Darling-Hammond,
Evaluating ‘No Child Left Behind,’ NATION (May 21, 2007); Daniel J. Losen, Challenging
Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the No Child Left Behind Act’s Race Conscious
Accountability, 47 HOW. L.J. 243, 244–45 (2004). Third, a federal educational accountability
structure now exists and states grudgingly comply. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 256–57, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2009); Connecticut v. Duncan, 612
F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2010). On their face, these “successes” might appear modest, but these
modest successes are consistent with more profound longterm reform. See Liebman & Sabel,
supra note 178, at 1720, 1735.
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triggered. 187
II. EDUCATION’S INHERENT CAUSAL PROBLEMS
The forgoing Sections identified the role of causal gaps in limiting
education reform across paradigms. The crucial underlying question is
whether these gaps are a result of poor litigation strategy and evidencegathering, or a natural byproduct of education. On one level, the
problem arises because education claims are framed, by litigants or
courts, in ways that are premised on precise causation, which requires
unobtainable evidence. Yet the precise framing of the claims does not
create the causal problem in the first instance; it only exacerbates it. The
real problem is that education itself is not conducive to causal showings.
The way that education is delivered, the way students learn, the various
factors that affect that learning, and the basic way we measure learning
frequently defy precise explanation. Because these aspects of education
defy clear explanation, plaintiffs might demonstrate that a school or
state has engaged in inequitable or prohibited conduct, but they are
unable to demonstrate how they have been harmed.
A. General Ambiguity
Education eludes causal clarity in various different respects. First,
how students receive education, what students actually receive, and how
one demonstrates or verifies what students have received are not fully
understood. Surely teaching fosters learning and that learning is later
demonstrated by students, but our understanding of learning is far from
a science. 188 At best, we know that certain things tend to work well or
work poorly. 189 Second, even when we know certain things tend to
work, those things do not remain constant. Schools, administrators,
teachers, and students can vary more than they coalesce. 190 Thus, to
speak of education, a school district, or even a school as “acting” or
“learning” in a particular way is, on some level, to engage in fictional
narrative. Policies, programs, and curriculums unify educational units,
allowing causal tendencies to emerge at the macro level, but causal
factors also operate at much lower levels that defy larger narratives and
measurement. 191 In short, when we analyze education, we are often
187. 20 U.S.C § 6316(b)(7) (2006) (describing sanctions for schools that fail to make
adequate yearly progress).
188. STACEY CHILDRESS, DENIS DOYLE & DAVID A. THOMAS, LEADING FOR EQUITY: THE
PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS at VI (2009).
189. See generally Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and
Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 657–58 (2009–10) (discussing
our limited knowledge regarding education reform).
190. Id. at 690–91 (discussing the highly contextualized variability at the classroom level).
191. Id.; see also Glenn Israel et al., The Influence of Family and Community Social
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working with imprecise generalizations.
Third, education is continually evolving and changing. Education is
a process rather than a finite and static resource that students receive.192
As such, there are nearly an infinite number of potential points of
causation, 193 and no point of causation alone is necessarily sufficient to
produce an identifiable effect or significant outcome. 194 This creates an
internal conflict in measuring educational effects. 195 Educational effects
tend to be reliably assessed only at the cumulative level. 196 Yet at the
cumulative level, attribution is more complex because many more
variables come into play—not all of which are measurable—and the
measureable variables are not necessarily constant. 197 In addition, as the
number of variables increases, so too does the possibility that the
variables will cancel each other out, which can result in otherwise
important variables manifesting minimal effects. 198
Fourth, and implicit in the foregoing, certain aspects of education
are polycentric. Policy changes can have secondary effects that
counteract the primary policy. For instance, testing students exclusively
on core subjects like math and science often leads to more instruction in
those areas, but less in others. 199 The reduced instruction in other areas,
such as physical education and art can result in less emotionally and
Capital on Educational Achievement, 66 RURAL SOC. 43, 45–48 (2001) (discussing the impact
that community and familial factors play in school performance).
192. See, e.g., Robert Balfanz & Vaughn Byrnes, Closing the Mathematics Achievement
Gap in High-Poverty Middle Schools: Enablers and Constraints, 11 J. EDUC. STUDENTS P LACED
AT RISK 143, 150–51 (2006) (discussing the varying gains that students make in math across
years and the inability to identify any consistent trend and explanatory factor).
193. See generally Terri A. DeMitchell & Todd A. DeMitchell, A Crack in the Educational
Malpractice Wall, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, available at http://www.aasa.org/School
AdministratorArticle.aspx?id=6516 (discussing a number of causative factors including
physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, and environmental factors, as well as student
attitude, motivation, temperament, past experiences, and home environment); James Traub, No
Child Left Behind; Does It Work, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/10/education/no-child-left-behind-does-it-work.html?pagewa
nted=all&src=pm (referring to an essay by E.D. Hirsch Jr., which argued that “so many
variables go into learning” that virtually no study can draw firm conclusions regarding reform).
194. Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151; Traub, supra note 193 (stating that
subjectivity makes it impossible to result in an objective answer as to how to better educate); see
also Thomas Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, Improving School Accountability Measures 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8156, 2001) (proposing more sophisticated
statistical analysis for education outcomes that would account for the infinite number of
variables that potentially influence academic performance).
195. Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 1–4.
196. Id.
197. Id.; see also Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151.
198. Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 1–4.
199. George R. Weiher & Kent L. Tedin, Minority Student Achievement, 23 REV. POL’Y
RES. 963, 963–67 (2006).
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physically healthy children. 200 Their diminished health can offset some
of the gains they would otherwise have made in math and science. 201
Similarly, states might increase teacher qualification standards to
improve education. Increasing standards will exclude some poor
teachers, but also dissuade other potentially good teachers from
pursuing teaching at all. The result could be a near-term shortage of
teachers and, consequently, larger class sizes, which can have
counterbalancing negative effects. 202 In short, education’s
polycentricism makes conceptualizing effective educational policy
difficult. And education’s prevailing ambiguity can make the effects of
even well-crafted policy immeasurable.
B. Externalities to Student Achievement
Extensive externalities operate on student achievement. The
externalities of greatest relevance arise from students’ experiences
outside of school. Regardless of the efforts schools make during the
day, these externalities can either support or undermine schools’ efforts
once the school day is over. 203 Students’ varying socioeconomic,
familial, housing, and medical situations (just to name a few) tend to
correlate with experiences outside of school that significantly affect
educational outcomes. 204 Yet the effect is not only on a student’s own
individual achievement, but also on the achievement of those around
him. The concentration of students with particular characteristics—such
as low or high socioeconomic status—in a school impacts all of the
students in that school. 205 In short, not only do a student’s own
externalities affect his achievement; other students’ externalities affect
that student’s achievement. 206 Thus, the overall demographic
200. Ken Petress, Perils of Current Testing Mandates, 33 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 80
(2006).
201. Suzanne M. Winter, Childhood Obesity in the Testing Era: What Teachers and
Schools Can Do!, 85 CHILDHOOD EDUC. 283, 289 (2009).
202. See, e.g., Thomas Nechyba et al., Public School Finance and Urban School Policy:
General Versus Partial Equilibrium Analysis, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN
AFFAIRS 139, 177 (2003).
203. Maryah Stella Fram et al., Poverty, Race and the Contexts of Achievement: Examining
Educational Experiences of Children in the U.S. South, 52 SOC. WORK 309, 309–11 (2007).
204. See generally COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 25; Fram, supra note 203, at 312–16;
Sara Sepanski Whipple et al., An Ecological Perspective on Cumulative School and
Neighborhood Risk Factors Related to Achievement, 31 J. APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 422, 422
(2010).
205. See Borman & Dowling, supra note 25, at 1239 (finding group level effects to be
greater than individual factors).
206. See id.; see also SUSAN EATON, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY HOW THE
RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS CONTRIBUTES TO
LITERACY, BEHAVIORAL CLIMATE, INSTRUCTIONAL ORGANIZATION AND HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATION RATES, 1–6 (2010) (reviewing research on “the relationship between the racial and
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characteristics of a school will significantly impact achievement in that
school, regardless of the school’s academic policies (though schools do
have the capacity to control their demographics through assignment
policies). Some schools will have student bodies that are predisposed
toward success, given that, in addition to what they are learning at
school, they are learning at home and over the summer. In contrast,
other schools will be predisposed to fall behind because their students’
outside learning opportunities are generally less robust. Of course, all
these group and individual factors interact with one another, amplifying,
mitigating, or canceling out one another. 207
The temporal dispersion of learning also increases the number of
externalities at play and the likelihood that externalities have
intervened. 208 Because student learning occurs across extended periods
of time, a student’s learning necessarily intersects with innumerable
factors and experiences. This is not to say that all of these factors and
experiences are significant, but only that they necessarily come into
play. The more external possibilities one identifies, the more difficult it
becomes to infer a causal connection between a challenged educational
policy and the educational outcome. Even putting significant
externalities aside, the passage of time alone makes causal inferences
more challenging because our understanding of causation is largely
based on the temporal connection between events. 209 In the absence of
temporal proximity, our propensity to infer causation dissipates.210
Thus, the mere passage of time can raise courts’ skepticism toward an
educational claim, prompting them to demand more specific causal
evidence. In short, there is an indefinite number of factors affecting
student outcomes. 211 Time only highlights the problem. 212
socioeconomic composition of a school”); James Paul Gee, Critical Issues: Reading and the
New Literary Studies: Reframing the National Academy of Sciences Report on Reading, 31 J.
LITERACY RES. 355, 360 (1999).
207. Sarah Archibald, Narrowing in on Educational Resources that Do Affect Student
Achievement, 81 PEABODY J. EDUC., 23, 35–36 (2006).
208. See generally MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN
LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 13 (2009) (indicating that remoteness in time can destroy
causation); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–44 (1992) (discussing the importance of
temporality in causation and ruling out other factors).
209. See Brown, supra note 208, at 30.
210. See id.
211. MARTHA MINOW ET AL., JUST SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF
DIFFERENCE 26–27 (2008).
212. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 802–04 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that the passage of
time made the connection between the achievement gap and past discrimination spurious); see
also Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 643, 653, 655, 658, 660 (2001) (discussing the multitude of factors relating to the
achievement gap).
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C. Educational Policy’s Capacity to Counterbalance Externalities
The point of accounting for student externalities is to determine the
extent to which school policy matters, particularly to student
achievement. Getting to this question, however, is never easy, and the
answers are rarely satisfying. For instance, as suggested above, the two
major education litigation movements, desegregation and school
finance, have struggled with whether the remedies sought would
improve student outcomes. Early on, courts largely assumed that
segregation harmed minority students’ achievement and, thus, any
remedy to segregation would bear positive academic results. 213 But as
the commitment to desegregation waned, both courts and scholars
began to examine the connection between improved academic
achievement and integration. 214 Although the connection definitely
exists,215 advocates and courts expected a far stronger and more certain
connection to justify the continuation of all-out desegregation. 216 The
nearly impossible standards from Dowell and Jenkins are reflections of
the concern over this causal connection. 217 Even today, when social
scientists have more clearly established a connection between racial
segregation and academic achievement (primarily because of the
socioeconomic isolation that accompanies it), 218 some members of the
Court still question the academic impact of integration. 219
The fundamental problem, however, is not that integration and
money fail to impact student outcomes, but that they are not silver
bullets and their impact is not as overwhelming as courts and policy
makers might expect. Decades of research, including federally funded
studies by the Department of Education, indicate that socioeconomically
integrative and segregative policies significantly impact student
achievement. 220 Even opponents of desegregation concede this point.221
213. Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673. This is not to suggest that the only harm of segregation
was academic. Segregation, without question, produced equally, if not more, harmful stigmatic
effects. See Brown, supra note 208, at 50.
214. MINOW, supra note 211, at 26–27; Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1706.
215. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 839–40
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1624–35.
216. Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1509–13; see Parker, supra note 68, at 522–34
(analyzing the Court’s tightening of the evidentiary basis for desegregation remedies).
217. Parker, supra note 68, at 519–21, 524; Ryan, supra note 76, at 1673.
218. See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 85
(1995).
219. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Michael Heise,
Brown Undone?: The Future of Integration in Seattle after Pics v. Seattle School District No. 1,
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 863–64 (2008).
220. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 25, at 21–22.
221. ARMOR, supra note 218, at 83–86 (indicating that poverty isolation was a cause of low
African-American achievement).
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The problem is that neither integrative policies, nor any other school
policy for that matter, fully control student achievement. Student
achievement is necessarily affected by the various externalities
discussed above. Each factor, including school policies, has only an
incremental effect on achievement, 222 and no single factor or
educational policy can explain or eradicate education failure alone. 223
Thus, the analytical flaw of courts and skeptics can be to expect an
overwhelming causal effect from educational policy. No one can fairly
criticize integration as failing to affect student achievement. At best,
one might criticize the academic effect of integration as being too
limited or failing to justify its costs. But such criticism is endemic to
most any educational policy, as all must contend with the externalities
that counteract educational policy. Nonetheless, the inability to
demonstrate that students’ low or increased academic achievement is
primarily the result of school policy is a barrier for education litigation.
Too often the implicit expectation remains that individual educational
policies render externalities moot, 224 while the stated assumption is that
externalities are so significant that courts doubt reforms can do anything
to close achievement gaps. In short, skeptics charge that achievement
gaps are intractable but then criticize education reform for failing to
wipe them out.
A similar set of expectations regarding the connection between
school policy and student outcomes exists in school finance. But there
the connection can be even more difficult to discern because certain
fundamental underlying variances between districts can appear to cancel
out the effect of varying financial resources in some localities. First, the
basic cost of schooling and the capacity to finance it varies from district
to district. 225 School districts vary in terms of their tax base, student
needs, and costs of operation. 226 As of yet, no reliable, exact standard
exists to compare districts across these measures. 227 One might account
for the variances in local costs associated with facilities, transportation,
and other non-instructional operations, as well as the funds that school
districts are currently raising, but the question of how much money any
district actually needs in order to offer an adequate education or
improve achievement includes some level of speculation or
222. See Whipple, supra note 204, at 426.
223. Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 151; see also DeMitchell & DeMitchell, supra
note 193.
224. See Adams, supra note 212, at 652, 660 (critiquing a requirement that past segregation
be the sole or primary cause of the achievement gap to justify an affirmative action plan).
225. See generally BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL
REPORT CARD 5, 7, 14–18 (2010), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_
2010.pdf; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 142–44.
226. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 14–18; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 142–44.
227. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 12.
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assumption. 228 For instance, teachers have preferences as to where they
teach and live that affect the cost of hiring them. 229 While some studies
offer broad generalities regarding how much it would cost to attract
high-quality teachers to needier schools and localities, 230 these
generalities are far from sufficient to set specific budgets for every
district in a state. Moreover, if a state allotted funds to needy districts,
but those funds were insufficient to attract high-quality teachers to
certain areas, student achievement would likely remain flat in some
areas even though teacher salaries increased. From this, one might infer
that money does not matter, when in fact the problem is that we do not
know how much money a particular location needs.
The second and interrelated problem is that schools allocate their
available funds in different ways, which makes determining whether
those funds are sufficient to meet their varying geographic and
demographic needs extremely difficult. 231 For instance, money might
not appear to matter much if all schools have resources in excess of
their need, as the surplus funds are spent on frivolous items.232
Conversely, if no schools have enough money, one presumably would
see qualitative differences between them based on how short of funds
each school is. But this assumption will not always hold true because in
228. The estimates have ranged from an additional 40%–60%. See, e.g., No Child Left
Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6333(a)(1), 6337(b)(1) (2006) (40% funding increase adjustment);
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INEQUALITIES IN PUB. SCH. DIST. REVENUES
62 (1998) (40% adjustment appropriate); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SCH. FIN.: PER-PUPIL SPENDING
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELECTED INNER CITY AND SUBURBAN SCHOOLS VARIED BY
METROPOLITAN AREA 30 (2002); Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, Educ. Trust, How States
Shortchange the Districts That Need the Most Help, in FUNDING GAPS 2006, 5, 6 (2006) (noting
a 60% adjustment, but using 40%).
229. Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES
326, 337 (2004) (finding “strong evidence that teachers systematically favor higher achieving,
nonminority, nonlow-income students”); Wendy Parker, Desegregating Teachers, 86 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1, 37 (2008); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 294
(1999).
230. See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF
TEACHERS IN LOW-PERFORMING HIGH SCHOOLS 7 (2008), http://www.all4ed.org/files/Teach
Dist_PolicyBrief.pdf (finding pay incentive alone has been insufficient to attract teachers);
Hanushek, supra note 229, at 350 (finding a 10% salary increase necessary for each increase of
10% in minority student enrollment to induce white females to teach in the school); id. at 351
(finding that a 25%–40% salary increase would be necessary to induce white females with two
or fewer years of experience to transfer from teaching in a suburban to an urban school).
231. See generally William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision As a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 615 (1994)
(noting that local variances make determining whether state funding is sufficient difficult);
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 7–8 (2010).
232. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990) (“[S]ince all districts in the state have
much more than whatever the minimum amount may be, the excess and the differences in the
excess, are irrelevant to the quality of education.”).
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the absence of sufficient funds schools make different strategic
choices—some wiser than others—about how to allocate limited
resources, which will result in some schools doing better or worse than
others in ways that do not relate to how much money they have. 233
Thus, while we know that districts vary substantially in what they spend
on schools and in their capacity to raise more funds, 234 precisely
identifying the extent to which money matters even in the poorest and
wealthiest districts is more complex because some schools with excess
surely squander funds and struggling schools vary in their response to
the shortage. In short, even if one can generally establish that money
matters, the basic question of how much money is necessary to put
schools on equal footing lingers.
None of the foregoing is to suggest that money does not matter. The
foregoing simply reveals that, even though we might be certain that
money matters, we are not certain how much it matters, nor how much
more we should afford to needy schools. We know that “money is only
one of a number of elements [involved in education]” 235 and is not the
sole or main determinant of education. Thus, its impact, like any other
educational policy, is going to be limited and subject to causal attack.
D. Indefinite Educational Harms
Education claims also suffer from a relative inability to identify and
quantify student harms. First, the primary method of assessing students
is through achievement, for which we have no reliable measure.
Currently, the primary method for student outcome evaluation is
through standardized tests. 236 Yet standardized tests do not necessarily
capture the full effect of particular educational policies. 237 While
standardized testing data is valuable, educational researchers have
lodged a bevy of criticisms against standardized tests, including that
they do not accurately reflect student learning or, at least, the most
important types of learning. 238 Regardless, a policy might very well
233. Id. at 404 (noting that money likely matters, but “can be used more effectively than it
is being used today”).
234. BAKER ET AL., supra note 225, at 26; Nechyba et al., supra note 202, at 155, 157.
235. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 404 (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d
129, 132 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236. Michael Heise, Courting Trouble: Litigation, High-Stakes Testing and Education
Policy, 42 IND. L. REV. 327, 341 (2009); W. James Popham, Standarized Testing Fails the
Exam, EDUTOPIA (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.edutopia.org/standardized-testing-evaluationreform.
237. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, High Stakes Are for Tomatoes, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (August
2000); Robert L. Linn, Assessments and Accountability, EDUC. RESEARCHER 4, 7, 10, 12 (2000);
W. James Popham, CTR. ON EDUC. POL’Y, The Role of Assessment in Federal Education
Programs 1 (2008).
238. Shrag, supra note 237; MINOW ET AL., supra note 211, at 38–39.
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impede a student’s learning, but not in a way that affects the student’s
standardized test achievement. 239 Or the effect may not be large enough
to produce a significant change on a standardized test. 240 Thus, the
primary method of establishing harm leaves plaintiffs in a quandary by
failing to reveal harms that otherwise exist. Second, even were
standardized tests a valid indicator of student learning, knowing
whether an education policy caused harm in that respect requires some
knowledge of how the student would have performed had a different
policy been in place, which, as discussed previously, involves a
significant degree of speculation. 241 Thus, the best one can do is to infer
a general harm based on statistical analyses of how other students
perform.
Third, and related, educational harms tend to be marginal. Rather
than absolute deprivations of opportunity, students most often
experience marginal differences in educational opportunity. 242
Likewise, student achievement operates on a sliding rather than an
absolute scale. 243 Thus, the harm an inequality might cause is marginal,
particularly when measured by standardized tests (which continue to be
affected by student externalities). For instance, consider a student who
is incorrectly suspended from school for three days, a school that
incorrectly diagnoses a student’s disability in the fall semester but
corrects it in the spring, or a student assignment policy that causes the
poverty level in a school to rise from 60% to 70%. Even if the conduct
were faulty in all of these examples, the change in most students’ endof-year performance on standardized tests will be small at worst and,
thus, the harm marginal.
While few would doubt that each of these policies harmed students
in some meaningful way, the inability to quantify a substantial harm can
be the legal equivalent of not causing any harm at all. For instance,
despite what might be gross educational failures by a school, some
courts have dismissed educational malpractice claims because they
questioned whether the student could demonstrate that the school had
caused a measurable harm. 244 Likewise, some have rejected segregation
and school finance claims because the exact extent of the harm is
239. See Linn, supra note 237, at 7–8.
240. See, e.g., W. James Popham, A Test is a Test—Not!, 64 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 88 (2006)
(critiquing standardized tests results as “fog[ging] over the effects of the instructional
interventions under study”).
241. See Kane & Staiger, supra note 194, at 2–3.
242. See generally W. James Popham, Why Standardized Tests Don’t Measure Educational
Quality, 56 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8 (1999), available at http://www.ascd.org/publications/educatio
nal-leadership/mar99/vol56/num06/Why-Standardized-Tests-Don't-Measure-Educational-Qualit
y.aspx (arguing that tests, at most, assess generalized group learning).
243. Id. (explaining how students learn material that is not tested on standardized exams).
244. See supra note 159.
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minimal or unquantifiable, even though students surely suffered some
harm. 245 In this respect, education tends to stand in stark contrast to
other areas of the law. Harms to non-educational interests—either
because they are conceptualized differently or are absolute—are not
subject to the ambiguities that breed skepticism about education claims.
For instance, in housing, individuals are denied and granted apartments
or homes; in employment, jobs, promotions, or raises. In tort claims,
plaintiffs suffer physical or property damage. In these cases, most often
the hurdle is not to establish the harm itself or that the defendant caused
it, but that the defendant’s conduct was faulty. 246 In contrast, with the
exception of proving intentional discrimination, the faulty educational
conduct that creates unequal funding, denies opportunity, or mislabels
students can be relatively obvious, while causation and harm are not.
Fourth, as suggested above, because educational harms are
marginal, they are often only reliably identifiable at the aggregate
level. 247 But identifying aggregate harm generally reveals very little
about whether a particular student or smaller subset of students, such as
a school or district, has been harmed, much less how much harm an
individual or smaller subset of students has suffered. By analyzing
statewide or national data, one might establish the general principle that
concentrated poverty or teacher quality affects student achievement. Yet
identifying a harm or its exact extent at the level of an individual
student, school, or district might be impossible.
Fifth, educational harms can be latent. For instance, the harm caused
by the failure to fully expose children to appropriate reading
opportunities in early grades may not manifest itself for years. 248
Because all children are initially novice or developing readers, the
differences between the properly educated child and other children are
smaller in early grades. 249 Consequently, immediately identifying the
harm and attributing it to a school’s action may be impossible in many
instances. That small difference between students, however, can grow
exponentially over time and lead to a large disparity. 250 Yet, while the
passage of time may make the disparity obvious, it will not necessarily
make the causal connection to the school’s action obvious. In fact, it
245. See supra notes 48–72 and 156–162 and accompanying text.
246. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
247. Balfanz & Byrnes, supra note 192, at 145.
248. See generally GORDON MACINNES, IN PLAIN SIGHT: SIMPLE, DIFFICULT LESSONS FROM
NEW JERSEY’S EXPENSIVE EFFORT TO CLOSE THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP (2009), at 8 (explaining
that kindergarten through third grade is when students learn to read, but in later grades students
must read to learn).
249. In fact, students learn to read in various different ways, which researchers do not fully
understand, and which make comparison among students and attribution of cause difficult. See
generally MACINNES, supra note 248.
250. See generally MACINNES, supra note 248.
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will do the opposite because the passage of time increases the
possibility that external factors have intervened and contributed to the
harm. Furthermore, the passage of time decreases the likelihood that
anyone will realize that a school’s action years ago may have
contributed to the harm. In effect, the long-past educational decision can
get lost among the numerous other potential causes, from which little
sense will likely be made.
In sum, the general ambiguity of education manifests itself in a
series of concrete evidentiary problems. The most obvious ones relate to
the various externalities that affect schools and students. These
externalities make identifying the causal connection between
educational policies and student achievement difficult. Even if a causal
connection can be established, plaintiffs may still be unable to
demonstrate an exact harm. Educational harms are often marginal,
latent, or group-based, and rarely individual and obvious. Yet, in the
absence of clear and substantial harm, courts tend to reject educational
claims, notwithstanding otherwise faulty conduct by a defendant.
III. SUSTAINING EDUCATION REFORM MOVEMENTS IN SPITE OF
EVIDENCE: THE LESSON OF CHARTER SCHOOLS
The success of charter schools suggests a potential way out of the
general rule of inevitable reform failure. Charter schools have a weaker
evidentiary basis than most other educational civil rights reforms, but
have nonetheless continued to expand. In fact, charter schools have
expanded in spite of evidence that very few outperform regular public
schools. Other educational civil rights movements have been cut short
based on far less. Charter schools have managed to succeed where
others have failed because their existence is not primarily based or
contingent on an evidentiary argument. Instead, charter schools make
particular value- and moral-based claims that resonate with broad
constituencies. These constituencies amount to a social movement for
charter schools that demands attention and is not easily dissuaded. In
contrast, educational civil rights movements, as of late, have failed to
make compelling value-based demands on society or inspire social
movements. As a result, these movements have remained at the mercy
of education’s inherent ambiguities. While civil rights advocates raise
valid concerns with charter schools, they would be better served by
learning from charter schools than by attacking them. Halting the
decline of educational civil rights reforms will only come from
rekindling their moral base, not from waging the same policy and
evidentiary wars that have lead them to their current situation.
A. The Rapid Rise of Charter Schools
Charter schools have enjoyed tremendous growth and policy support
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over the past two decades. The first charter school did not open until
1992 in Minnesota and, at the time, only one state other than Minnesota
had legislation that even authorized the creation of a charter school. 251
The next year, eight states authorized the creation of charter schools,
and the actual number of charter schools in operation grew to thirtysix.252 Three years later, over half of the states had authorized the
creation of charter schools, and the number of charter schools continued
to expand exponentially, doubling each year for several consecutive
years. 253 Today, there are over five thousand charter schools in
operation 254 and approximately 1.6 million children enrolled in them. 255
Only ten states now lack charter school legislation, five of which are in
the upper northwest where student populations are relatively small and
deconcentrated. 256

Federal legislation has, likewise, rapidly changed over the past two
decades. It has gone from expressing passing interest to now attempting
to force states to adopt charters. The first federal funding of charter
schools was in 1995 and a mere $6 million appropriation. 257 Within just
five years, Congress had increased the appropriation to $145 million,258
which represented incredible growth, but was still a small amount
relative to other education funding. This trend of increase continued in
251. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 1, at 3–4; see also Peterson, supra note 13.
252. Id. at iii.
253. Id.
254. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 2; see also CTR. FOR RES. ON
EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 2, at 9.
255. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., About Public Charter Schools,
http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/aboutschools (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
256. NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR PUB. CHARTER SCHS., supra note 3.
257. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 1, at i.
258. Id.
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subsequent years, and charter schools are currently a dominant federal
strategy. In 2009, the Obama administration created a $4.3 billion
competitive grant program (“Race to the Top”) designed to spur specific
changes in educational policy. 259 States’ eligibility for a grant was
contingent on promoting charter schools and eliminating barriers to
their growth. 260 As the Secretary of Education proclaimed: “States that
do not have public charter laws or put artificial caps on the growth of
charter schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the
Top Fund . . . We want real autonomy for charters combined with a
rigorous authorization process and high performance standards.” 261 In
response, many states quickly dropped their long-standing resistance to
charters, the most important of which were explicit caps on the number
of charter schools that could operate in a state. 262 Today, quite simply,
the fascination with charter schools is so intense that charter schools
effectively suck the air out of the conversation regarding education
reform. Other reform policies do not appear to be judged on their
merits, but rather on their consistency with or relationship to a charter
school agenda. It is increasingly revealing that charter schools have
become the default reform strategy and alternative to traditional public
schools. 263 The most obvious example is in New Orleans, where the
plan to rebuild the city’s ineffective system after Hurricane Katrina was
almost exclusively based on charter schools. After the storm, nearly
60% of the schools in the city were charters. 264
B. Charter School Performance
The meteoric rise of charter schools implies that a solid research
base or track record establishes their effectiveness in delivering quality
education and improving educational outcomes. No such reliable
evidence or track record exists, which would come as a surprise to
many, including parents who have their children enrolled in charter
schools. To be clear and fair, several charter schools perform amazingly
well. For instance, the KIPP charter schools (Knowledge is Power
Program) have produced impressive results, in large part by using the
259. Sam Dillon, Administration Takes Aim at State Laws on Teachers, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2009, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/education/24educ.html.
260. Sam Dillon, After Criticism, the Administration Is Praised for Final Rules on
Education Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2009, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/11/12/education/12educ.html.
261. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., States Open to Charters Start Fast in ‘Race to
Top’: Education Secretary Seeking Autonomy with Real Accountability for School Innovators
(June 8, 2009).
262. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 6.
263. See, e.g., Holley-Walker, supra note 27, at 128–29; Robert Garda, The Politics of
Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 57, 57–58, 68 (2011).
264. Holley-Walker, supra note 27, at 127–28.
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flexibility of the charter school model to deliver 60% more instructional
time than traditional public schools. 265 Students who remain in KIPP
charter schools have made huge achievements, 266 moving from being
several years behind their peers in learning to outperforming almost all
of their peers. 267 Several non-KIPP charter schools are likewise
successful. In Massachusetts, already a top state in academic
performance, charter schools held three of the top ten slots on the state’s
tenth grade math test in 2008. 268 While these results are not the norm for
charter schools, several studies indicate that a substantial portion of
charter schools have outperformed public schools. In fact, nationally,
15% to 20% of charter schools significantly outperform public
schools. 269
The value these charter schools add to the communities they serve
cannot be overstated, but, on the whole, charter schools struggle to
perform at levels comparable to public schools and frequently
underperform significantly. Only a few national studies of charter
schools have been completed, but when comparing similarly situated
students in traditional public schools and charter schools, the studies
reach the same result: students in charter schools underperform. The
U.S. Department of Education studied the results of the 2003 and 2007
National Assessment of Educational Progress and found that charter
school students underperformed regular public school students in fourth
grade reading, fourth grade math, and eighth grade math. 270 The only
area in which they even performed on par with public schools on these

265. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM:
HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 135 (2010); Andrew C. Mendrala,
Comment, Wasted Money and Insufficient Remedies in Adequacy Litigation: The Case for an
Extended School Day and Year to Provide Students Access to Constitutionally Mandated
Curriculum, 54 HOW. L.J. 175, 212–14 (2010).
266. Critics have charged that unusually large number of students drop out or are kicked
out of KIPP schools, which deceptively skews achievement scores upward. See Gary Miron et
al., What Makes KIPP Work? A Study of Student Characteristics, Attrition, and School Finance
ii (March 2010), http://www.edweek.org/media/kippstudy.pdf (finding the drop-out rate for
African-American males is 40% between the sixth and eighth grades in KIPP).
267. See generally, Independent Reports, KNOWLEDGE IS POWER PROGRAM, http://www.ki
pp.org/about-kipp/results/ independent-reports (last visited June 23, 2012) (summarizing the
results of various independent studies of achievement results in KIPP schools).
268. Top Scoring Schools on the 10th Grade MCAS, BOS. GLOBE, http://www.boston.com/
news/special/education/mcas/scores08/10th_top_schools.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
269. CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 1, at 46.
270. NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT
CARD: AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS—RESULTS FROM THE NAEP 2003 PILOT STUDY 1, 7
(2004), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2005456.pdf; Erik W.
Robelen, NAEP Gap Continuing for Charters; Sector’s Scores Lag in Three Out of Four Main
Categories, 27 EDUC. WEEK 1 (2008).
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measures was in eighth grade reading. 271 A 2009 national study by
Stanford University researchers was even more pointed. The study
found that over 80% of charter schools perform the same or worse than
public schools. 272 A full 37% of charter schools performed significantly
worse than comparable public schools. 273
Those studies that present charter schools as high-performing and
good alternatives to traditional public schools tend to leave out
important facts and compare apples to oranges. First, these studies do
not establish that inner-city charter schools are outperforming public
schools in general. Rather, at most, they establish that charter schools
are outperforming nearby public schools or public schools in their
school districts. 274 Second, although some charter schools do
outperform local public schools, studies promoting this conclusion want
to have their cake and eat it too. They argue comparisons to public
schools in general are unfair because of demographic differences, and
suggest that the appropriate comparison is to local public schools
because they have comparable demographics. 275 While the former point
may be accurate, the latter is not because charter schools frequently
enroll substantially smaller proportions of special education and English
Language Learner students than the schools in their communities. 276 In
addition, the fact that charter schools require affirmative effort by
parents to enroll their children would tend to indicate that charter
schools have student bodies with highly motivated students or parents
who are predisposed toward higher achievement, 277 which again
distinguishes them from the general student population, even if that
population is local. In short, studies finding that charter schools are
outperforming public schools tend to compare a motivated, monolithic
group of nondisabled students who speak English as a first language to
a local population that includes students with low levels of familial
support, low levels of motivation, learning disabilities, and language
barriers. When the achievement of students in charter schools is
compared to the achievement of demographically similar students in
regular public schools, the illusion of outstanding performance
disappears. Once these factors are taken into account, the most
favorable appraisal of charter schools is that “none of the studies detects
271. Robelen, supra note 270.
272. See CTR. FOR RES. ON EDUC. OUTCOMES, supra note 2, at 1.
273. Id.
274. See generally RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 138–44.
275. See generally RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 138–44.
276. FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 2, 3, 12; see also Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture
Clash: Special Education in Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 657, 659 (2012) (discussing
how charter schools struggle to enroll disabled students).
277. RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 144.
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huge effects—either positive or negative” of attending a charter
school. 278
C. Value-Based Movements Versus Evidentiary Claims
The crucial question for educational civil rights advocates is how
charter schools have garnered so much support in the past two decades,
based on such thin evidence, when civil rights remedies have lost so
much ground, despite relatively strong evidence supporting them. The
answer is that charter schools have gained traction, in large part, based
on the values and principles they represent, not the evidence behind
them. 279 Charter schools are premised on the importance of individual
choice and the power of markets to produce beneficial outcomes. 280
Charter school advocates argue that, because traditional public schools
are insular bureaucracies, they are shielded from competitive pressure
and lack the capacity to change. A market-based system of schooling
would weed out weak schools, reward good ones, and over time
produce a system of high-quality schools. 281 Parental autonomy and
individual rights also dictate that parents and students should not be
restricted to the poor public schools to which a district might assign
them, but rather should have the choice to attend school elsewhere. 282
Regardless of what the evidence suggests about charter school
performance, these two key values create a built-in constituency for
charter schools: communities with low quality schools, parents in all
communities who want choice for various personal reasons, and the
business community. Many inner-city communities have been
disaffected from the educational system for some time, as meaningful
and stable school desegregation never occurred and adequate resources,
teachers, curriculum, and pedagogy have generally been in short
supply. 283 In addition, some inner-city communities see public schools
278. Tom Loveless & Katharyn Field, Perspectives on Charter Schools, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON SCHOOL CHOICE (Mark Berends et al. eds., 2009) (reviewing research on charter
schools).
279. RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 143.
280. See, e.g., CHUBB & MOE, supra note 20, at 1–25.
281. Id. at 20–21 (explaining how the educational choices of everyone from students and
teachers to interest group leaders and politicians, and the consequences of these choices, are
influenced by their institutional context—which in turn explains “why different kinds of
organizations emerge, prosper, or fail within them”). But see Minow, supra note 7, at 269–70
(arguing that while some degree of competition could improve school systems plagued by
bureaucracy, the assumptions at work in market competition to produce better products are not
mirrored in the school context).
282. The federal government premised its school transfer provision in NCLB on this
principle. Choices for Parents, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/choice/
index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
283. See, e.g., Preston C. Green, III, Preventing School Desegregation Decrees from
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as simply a small piece of a much larger system designed to move poor
minority students seamlessly toward jail. 284 Thus, despite national civil
rights leaders’ opposition to charter schools, 285 many inner-city
communities have been quick to seize the opportunity to opt out of
traditional public schools. 286 Even if a charter school proved no more
academically effective than a public school, parents express value in the
opportunity to control their children’s destiny for the first time, and
skepticism toward waiting for the eventual vindication of civil rights
principles. 287
Although smaller in number, parents from other communities also
share inner-city parents’ interest in school choice. A substantial number
of parents believe in choice not because they need an alternative to
traditional public schools, but because choice is a fundamental value for
them. 288 Even where public schools are effective, substantial numbers
of parents send their children to private school or home school, for a
variety of reasons. For these parents (and libertarians), the ability to
choose their children’s schools and more directly control their education
is a basic parental right that the state has no legitimate authority to
constrain. 289
Finally, charter schools appeal to the business community on both a
practical and theoretical level. Charter school legislation creates a new
market for business. 290 In the past, the business community’s only
opportunity to enter the primary and secondary education sector was
through private schools. But this market is relatively small because it is
Becoming Barriers to Charter School Innovation, 144 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 19 (2000) (noting
African-Americans’ dissatisfaction with desegregation and attraction to charters).
284. Sarah J. Forman, Ghetto Education, WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2012).
285. See generally Fernanda Santos, N.A.A.C.P. on Defensive as Suit on Charter Schools
Splits Group’s Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2011, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/06/11/nyregion/naacp-on-defensive-for-suit-against-charter-schools.html?_ref=char
terschools (discussing the NAACP’s choice to defend public schools against charters because of
the resulting educational inequalities); cf. Gary Orfield, Foreword, in CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY:
CHARTER SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS STANDARDS 1–3 (2010)
(discussing how the charter school movement has been a civil rights failure).
286. See Green, supra note 283, at 19.
287. See id. at 23. See generally Saatcioglu et al., supra note 28, at 434 (discussing factors
that are more important than academics for charter school parents).
288. Ellen B. Goldring & Kristie J.R. Phillips, Parent Preference and Parent Choices: The
Public-private Decision About School Choice, 23 J. EDUC. POL’Y 209, 212 (2008); see also
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85–107 (2002).
289. See Goldring & Phillips, supra note 288; see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).
290. James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education? Emerging
Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 865
(2007) (charter school legislation “make[s] it relatively easy for new providers to enter the
market”).
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limited to wealthier individuals who can finance their children’s
education. 291 Charter school legislation effectively opens the public
education market up to private competition, and finances that
competition by covering the cost of sending students to privately
managed schools. But most in the business community have little
interest in running a school and reap no direct monetary benefit from
charter schools. For this larger business community, charter schools
have a value-based appeal because they are run more like businesses
and subject to competition that they believe is sorely needed in
education. 292 In short, charter school legislation amounts to no less than
a validation of the business model.
These charter school constituents are important because they help
create a movement rather than just a policy agenda for charter
schools. 293 This movement is based on values, not social science or
academic outcomes. 294 Thus, these constituents can remain in favor of
charter schools regardless of the charges detractors might levy. Parents
can severely discount evidence that charter schools do not improve
educational outcomes when their primary support for charter schools is
based on choice, not results. 295 This is not to say that such evidence is
irrelevant, as surely all hoped charter schools would offer their children
better educational opportunities, but the evidence is not decisive. The
business community may be even less susceptible to persuasion. It is
hard to imagine how one convinces the business community that market
principles do not work in schools. Regardless of what evidence is
available, the business community is not going to concede that the very
values upon which it has succeeded are flawed. Moreover, the business
community is quick to respond that the market will work if given
enough time. 296
For these reasons, charter school policy has been heavily supported
and resistant to critique. By promoting charters based on values as much
as evidence, supporters created a valued-based movement that has
propelled charter schools into expanded existence. A movement based
on values, unlike one based on evidence, draws far more committed
291. Private schools serve 10% of the student population, and the average tuition at private
secular schools is approximately $17,000 per year. Facts and Studies, COUNCIL FOR AM.
PRIVATE EDUC., http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
292. See CAROL ASCHER ET AL., HARD LESSONS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PRIVATIZATION 14–
15 (1996).
293. RAVITCH, supra note 265, at 143.
294. See, e.g., Gregg A. Garn, Arizona Charter Schools: A Case Study of Values and
School Policy, 3 CURRENT ISSUES IN EDUC. 7 (Oct. 12, 2000), http://cie.asu.edu/volume3/
number7/; Loveless & Field, supra note 278, at 111–12.
295. Cf. Saatcioglu et al., supra note 28, 432–33 (noting that parents of children enrolled in
charters are likely satisfied even if their academic programs are lacking).
296. See ASCHER ET AL., supra note 292, at 8.
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supporters, and their primary motivations are not really subject to
debate or contingent on effective performance of the underlying policy.
Thus, the causal gaps that have ultimately operated to limit every major
civil rights education reform movement have not impeded charter
schools. Of course, they may still bring down charter schools in the
future, but the point here is that charter schools have made it this far in
spite of the evidence because of a powerful value-based movement.
When viewed in this light, charter schools stand in stark contrast to
the current status of most educational civil rights movements. Yet they
also resemble civil rights movements at various times in the past. By
focusing on the extent to which value-based social movements and
interests were afoot, the failures and uneven trajectories of civil rights
and other education reforms make far more sense. For instance, as
described earlier, the struggle for desegregation is really a tale of two
different histories: one of rapid expansion and another of consistent
contraction. But what the earlier Section did not thoroughly address was
desegregation’s value-based claim. In its earliest stages, desegregation
was as much a moral claim as a legal claim. 297 Its moral claim was hard
to deny, while its legal and evidentiary claims were far less certain. 298
Likewise, improving academic outcomes for minority students was
important, but not necessarily the driving force. Rather, bringing down
racial apartheid was an end in and of itself. 299 The very existence of
forced segregation was an affront to African-Americans’ humanity,
regardless of the academic effect. Moreover, segregation created serious
internal contradictions in society. As Professor Derrick Bell emphasized
throughout his life, the country’s need to resolve the contradiction
between its theoretical commitment to freedom and equality and its
domestic reality of discrimination and inequality lead to the Court’s
holding in Brown. 300
Value-based arguments focused on these issues—rather than any
particular evidence—eventually made it possible for a moral majority to
rally around desegregation. 301 The coalescing of a moral majority
297. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 39, at 62.
298. Compare Brown, Legislative History with Liebman & Sabel, supra note 178, at 1743–
44.
299. See Michael R. Belknap, The Real Significance of Brown v. Board of Education: The
Genesis of the Warren Court’s Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 863, 882, 891 (2004); see
generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); WILKINSON, supra note 39, at 46.
300. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49–58 (2004); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown
v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524–25
(1980).
301. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 440 (1999)
(“More importantly, desegregation was achieved less by legal enactment than by . . . moral
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brought supportive civil rights legislation, judicial enforcement, and a
rapid expansion of desegregation throughout the South during the late
1960s and early 1970s. 302 But when desegregation moved outside the
South and the image of stark apartheid was no longer apparent, the
moral imperative weakened, and various other practicalities suddenly
became relevant. 303 In fact, it was this very dilemma that Justice Lewis
Powell emphasized in his opinion in Keyes when he wrote:
No comparable progress has been made in many
nonsouthern cities with large minority populations
primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction
nurtured by the courts and accepted complacently by many
of the same voices which denounced the evils of segregated
schools in the South. But if our national concern is for
those who attend such schools, rather than for perpetuating
a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality, we
must recognize that the evil of operating separate schools is
no less in Denver than in Atlanta. 304
The majority of the Court saw the issue differently.
Beginning in Keyes and continuing the next year in Milliken,
desegregation morphed from a moral imperative that commanded a
movement, to legal and social policy that was up for debate and
scrutiny. Once that shift occurred, the inherent causal gaps of education
were readily available to limit and end desegregation. 305 Since then,
desegregation has never been able to rearticulate itself in strong valueor justice-based terms. 306 Instead, desegregation today is largely
relegated to being an effective academic policy that school districts
ought to adopt of their own volition,307 but it is largely devoid of a
compelling moral or value claim. As a result, desegregation continues to
decline in relevance with each year that passes. 308
The successes and failures of school finance do not fit as neatly into
the framework of value- and justice-based claims as desegregation
leadership.”); Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Sociology to Constitutional
Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science Research and Law, 14 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 61, 105 (2008).
302. ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 79.
303. See Oakes, supra note 301, at 64.
304. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 218–19 (1973).
305. See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 53–79 and accompanying text.
307. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR
CIV. RTS., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID
RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1 (2011).
308. See generally RYAN, supra note 231, at 14, 273 (noting that desegregation has become
“unfashionable”).
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because of the myriad different circumstances and factors at play in the
various states. But the idea that long-term school finance success is as
dependent on building an extrajudicial movement and appealing to
values as the strength of any underlying evidentiary claim still
resonates. As a general matter, successful school finance litigation has
often resulted in judicial opinions that are about far more than the
evidence, the text of the constitution, or the existence of inequality.
First, successful school finance opinions have frequently arisen out of
the existence of deplorable schools that morally shame the state. 309 For
instance, in New York, the plaintiffs presented evidence that school
buildings were overcrowded and suffered from “leaky roofs, deficient
heating, and other problems,” 310 and raised the question of whether
some were hazardous. 311 The evidence presented an even bleaker
picture in Ohio. There, the state supreme court wrote of floors so thin
that teachers’ feet would fall through them, structures beset by asbestos
but denied the money to abate it, coal heating systems that would cover
student desks with coal dust overnight, walls that were literally
crumbling, and plaster that was literally falling. 312 Like Brown,
conditions of this sort appear unjust and, regardless of the details of
constitutional intent, jurists and the public must struggle with the
question of how the Constitution could possibly tolerate the situation.
Second, courts have framed these cases in terms of how much is at
stake for disadvantaged students as a way of elevating the state’s
responsibility. A trial court in South Carolina emphasized the negative
effects of poverty and the fact that the education system was students’
primary opportunity to escape. The court found that “poverty is . . . both
the parent and the child of poor academic achievement. Each follows
the other in a debilitating and destructive cycle until some outside
agency or force interrupts the sequence.” 313 Thus, the effects of poverty
on education must be addressed “as early as possible in the lives of the
children affected by it.” 314 This judicially articulated moral imperative
helps explain why the trial court followed the supreme court’s mandate
and ordered not just reforms to the education system, but
prekindergarten services for poor students. 315 The New Jersey Supreme
Court has been even more forthright in its equity and justice concerns
309. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 501 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2001); Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 121 (Ala. 1993).
310. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. New York, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 911 (N.Y. 2003).
311. Id.
312. DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733, 742-43 (Ohio 1997).
313. Abbeville v. State, Case No. 93-CP-31-0169155, at 155 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 29,
2005).
314. Id. at 158.
315. Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999).
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over poor children’s plight, writing:
We realize . . . that no amount of money may be able to
erase the impact of the socioeconomic factors that define
and cause these pupils’ disadvantages [and] that perhaps
nothing short of substantial social and economic change
affecting housing, employment, child care, taxation, [and]
welfare will make the difference for these
students . . . . [But] even if not a cure, money will help,
and . . . these students are constitutionally entitled to that
help.
If the claim is that additional funding will not enable
the poorer urban districts to satisfy the thorough and
efficient test, the constitutional answer is that they are
entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of
money as their competitors. 316
Although not as pointedly, other courts have seized upon similar
themes in describing the long-term effects of inequitable and inadequate
education on society. A common rhetorical method in some states has
been to speak of education in terms of what students need to succeed in
life, 317 deserve as a matter of fairness, or would be entitled to if they
lived in some other neighboring state. 318 When courts write in these
terms, they are not making the case that their respective state
constitutions intended to guarantee a specific result, but that if their
constitutions are just they must.
Finally, the most important factor in the implementation of
meaningful remedies in school finance is the existence of popular
support or a coordinated movement. Extrajudicial support is at least
indirectly, if not directly, motivated by moral and social claims.
Litigation alone is but a piece of a much larger puzzle in the struggle to
secure equal or adequate education. The events that follow a judicial
opinion, rather than the opinion itself, dictate success. 319 The most
obvious examples are in those states where voters have simply removed
justices who supported education reform from office, and replaced them

316. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990).
317. See Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 317 (Kan. 2005) (Beier, J., concurring)
(“Education is vital for each citizen and no less imperative for the survival and progress of our
republic.”).
318. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391 n.6 (Vt. 1997).
319. See Matt Brooker, Comment, Riding the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:
Navigating Troubled Waters, 75 UMKC L. REV. 183, 187 (2006); Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at
the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2006).
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with others who promptly reversed their predecessors’ holdings. 320 In
these states, school finance advocates failed to build larger social
movements and gain political support, which allowed raw political
power to trump constitutional history, precedent, and rights.
Though not always as dramatic, similar principles play out in state
legislatures after a court issues its decision. As Professor James Ryan’s
scholarship reveals, the most meaningful battle for school finance
reform is won or lost in the legislature. 321 Separation of powers prevents
courts from compelling the legislature to act. 322 An actual remedy for
educational inadequacy and inequity only comes through legislation that
is palatable to political majorities in the legislature. Certainly, state
supreme courts play an important role in initiating reform and offer
legislators cover in doing the right thing, but moral, racial, and social
concerns weigh heavily regardless of a court’s decision. 323 Thus,
bringing actual reform to schools ultimately depends on elections, social
movements, and the persuasiveness of the justice claims advocates
frame. As Professors Charles Sabel and William Simon argue, the
primary function of school finance litigation is to secure a seat at the
decision-making table for otherwise excluded groups. 324 But a seat, of
course, does not guarantee a desired result. Rather, a seat at the table
only provides the opportunity to exert influence on decision makers and
popular sentiment, 325 both of which are dependent on public values and
support, not necessarily evidentiary and legal conclusions.
The No Child Left Behind Act may be the most recent and salient
example of education reform quickly doomed by disregard for
developing a constituency. The flaw in NCLB’s causal claim was
detrimental because the Act lacked a constituency. To suggest the Act
lacked a broad-based constituency from the outset seems
counterintuitive, given that it was passed with bipartisan support. 326 Yet
NCLB’s ardent supporters were largely limited to the Washington
political establishment, corporate interests demanding “results,” and
testing agencies. 327 States were immediately fearful of the Act’s
320. See, e.g., Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 820 (Ala. 2002) (Houston J., concurring);
State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195, 198, 202–03 (Ohio 2003).
321. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 432, 432, 433–44, 458, 462, 470, 476 (1999).
322. Scott R. Bauries, Is There An Elephant In The Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and The Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 704, 708,
759–60 (2010).
323. Ryan, supra note 321, at 432, 448–49, 451, 463.
324. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 145, at 1024–25.
325. See, e.g., id. at 1021–28.
326. PATRICK J. MCGUINN, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICY, 1965–2005, 177 (2006).
327. Stephen Metcalf, Reading Between the Lines, THE NATION (Jan. 28, 2002),
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unobtainable goals and sanctions, 328 and only reluctantly capitulated to
the Act after they were promised funding and safety valves for
failure. 329 Communities were not necessarily hostile toward the bill, but
neither were they supportive. Whether a community had good or bad
schools, no significant constituency was calling for increased testing as
a means to improve education. 330
As previously described, NCLB was a bill that had to be sold to the
public rather than a bill the community demanded. While the causal
claim was central to selling the bill, supporters also offered a moral or
justice claim. The Act’s title itself indirectly asserted that we had
abandoned a subset of children and were now obligated to respond.
President Bush consistently pushed this claim to its moral extremes,
arguing that poor and minority children were suffering from the “soft
bigotry of low expectations.” 331 The notion that schools were not
intentionally discriminating against students, but that their low
expectations were a subtle form of discrimination, resonated. 332 This
claim made the Act difficult to oppose and allowed many to go along
with the bill, even though they were not committed supporters. For
instance, civil rights leaders could easily condone a bill aimed at
eliminating this bias, even if it was ineffective. And if nothing else, civil
rights leaders believed the Act’s testing and data regime, more than any
other policy in the past, would expose the vast inequality and hypocrisy
in public education. 333 The point is that neither the civil rights nor any
other community was leading the fight for this bill. Rather, the small
Washington constituency pushing the Act secured others’ tacit
agreement by asserting a moral claim. But when the central causal
premise of the Act failed, its moral claim rang hollow and its lack of a
committed constituency was exposed. States and communities quickly

http://www.thenation.com/article/reading-between-lines?page=full[8/30/2012.
328. FRONTLINE, supra note 178.
329. Id.
330. See David S. Broder, Long Road to Reform: Negotiators Forge Education Legislation,
WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2001, at A01 (describing intense suspicion of the bill from members of
both parties and the extreme criticism of Senator Edward Kennedy for helping broker a deal to
pass the bill).
331. See, e.g., Dillon, supra note 162; see also Rod Paige, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Remarks at
the Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t: Fifty Years After Brown: What Has Been Accomplished and What
Remains to Be Done? (Apr. 22, 2004) (castigating “de facto educational apartheid”).
332. See generally William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat
from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why it Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 577 (2006)
(indicating that this rhetoric served as a “rallying cry” that brought Senator Kennedy and
President Bush together). James Foreman, Jr. points out, however, that his claim was little more
than a cliché because no one would really disagree with high expectations for all students. James
Foreman, Jr., Education for Liberation, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 75, 79 (2008).
333. See, e.g., Losen, supra note 186, at 245.
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lost all tolerance for the Act. 334 Even the Act’s initial supporters began
harshly criticizing it. 335 By the 2008 elections, presidential and
congressional candidates almost uniformly opposed the Act and
promised to gut or seriously revamp it. 336 In short, NCLB is just another
example of education reform premised on an evidentiary claim and
lacking a movement, the absence of which spells the quick end of
reform.
CONCLUSION
The various educational civil rights movements have had a long and
storied history, which includes periods of both significant rights
expansion and contraction. Because litigation has been so central to
these movements, the temptation is to view them solely through the
evidence they develop and the judiciary’s evaluation of it. Viewed in
this light, the successes and failures of movements appear dependent on
the quality of the war waged at trial and the potential predilections of
appellate courts. To be clear, strong litigation movements have achieved
numerous successes, but these litigation reform movements have also
uniformly and inevitably been cut short.
While the instinct of many litigators and civil rights advocates is to
marshal better evidence, evidence cannot provide the solution. Even
during times of success, educational civil rights claims have not been
free from evidentiary gaps. Rather, courts were simply willing to
overlook them. The unfortunate truth is that the nature of education
itself breeds causal ambiguity. Because so many factors affect
educational outcomes, and learning occurs over time rather than
instantaneously, it is nearly impossible to establish that a given
educational policy—such as an additional $1,000 of per pupil
spending—will produce a particular outcome for any particular group of
students. In general, the most evidence can do is reveal trends and
identify the likelihood of outcomes. And as movements age, courts (and
legislatures) eventually grow skeptical of the claims, and generalized
evidence becomes insufficient to sustain the movement. In fact, some
are skeptical from the outset of a movement, and the evidence does
334. See, e.g., Criticism of NCLB Mounts as Numerous Schools Are Identified as “In Need
of Improvement,” EDUCATION ACCESS (Aug. 28, 2003), http://www.schoolfunding.info/news/fe
deral/8-28-03nclbcriticism.php3 (indicating that criticism of the Act from the local level was
already mounting just one year after the Act was passed).
335. Gail Russell Chaddock, “No Child Left Behind” Losing Steam, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (March 21, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0321/p01s01-legn.html.
336. Interestingly, the Act has yet to be reformed. This is attributable to various factors
having nothing to do with education. Regardless, the Department of Education has agreed to
waive the Act’s various requirements rather than wait for Congress to revise it. See Dillon,
supra note 168.
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nothing to change their minds. No examples exist where educational
civil rights advocates have been able to reverse skepticism or retraction
with newfound and better evidence. The required evidence simply does
not exist in education.
Given this unfortunate reality, educational civil rights reform either
is futile in the long term or must fortify itself with more than evidence.
The recent rise of charter schools reveals that the answer may be in the
latter. In comparison to the other civil rights movements, the evidence
supporting charter schools is less than impressive. Yet charter schools
have expanded exponentially, while most traditional civil rights
movements have done the converse, and the rest may be on the verge.
Charter schools have been able to defy the odds because they are reliant
on a social movement and values, rather than evidence. In important
respects, the evidence supporting charter schools is simply irrelevant
and overshadowed by charter schools’ direct appeal to parents’ and
business leaders’ fundamental values, both of whom comprise an
unflinching constituency that pushes charter school policy forward at all
levels of government.
Of course, educational civil rights claims have not always been
without their moral- and value-based claims. In fact, a holistic review of
the trajectory of past victories suggests that the moral- and value-based
claims, rather than actual evidence, propelled these movements. Today,
however, advocates often struggle to articulate educational civil rights
in terms of compelling values and morals, which are predicates to
building the extrajudicial movements and political support necessary to
sustain movements. Without such claims and broader support,
educational civil rights reforms devolve into mere policy options that
are in competition with various others. Unfortunately, a battle of
evidence has not been and will not be enough to protect or expand
educational civil rights. Thus, the imperative for school integration,
school finance, English Language Learners, and disability reform is to
reclaim and rearticulate their moral- and value-based core. Indentifying
what those claims look like for each of those movements is the subject
of another article, but recognizing that this work must be done is the
only viable step to stem their trend of limited relevance.
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